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THE POLITICS OF POLICING: ENSURING
STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION IN THE
FEDERAL REFORM OF LOCAL LAW

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
KAMI CHAVIS SIMMONS*
The principle of the sovereignty of the people, which to some extent always underlies
nearly all human institutions, is ordinarily wrapped in obscurity. People obey it
without recognizing it; if light should chance briefly to fall on it, they are quick to
relegate it to the darkness of the sanctuary.1

Title 42 U.S. C. § 14141 authorizes the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ") to seek injunctive reliefagainst local law enforcement agencies to
eliminate a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct by these
agencies. Rather than initiate lawsuits to reform these agencies, DOJ's
current strategy is to negotiate reforms using a process that involves only
DOJ representatives, municipality officials, and police management

officials. While there are many benefits of negotiating the reforms, the
current process excludes important stakeholders directly impacted by the
reforms, including community members, who are the consumers of police
services, and the rank-and-file police officers, whom the reforms may
adversely impact. The exclusion of these groups is not only inconsistent
with general norms of democratic inclusion, but it is also inconsistent with
the paradigm of community policing that emphasizes the benefits of policecommunity partnerships. Ultimately, exclusion of these stakeholders
undermines the legitimacy of the reforms, thereby threatening the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law
School. B.A., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to thank
Ronald Wright, Sidney Shapiro, Ronald Krotoszynski, Roger Fairfax, N. Jeremi Duru,
Michael Pinard, Danielle Holley-Walker, and Omari Scott Simmons for their insightful
comments, and Sally Irvin, Benjamin Carafiol, and Joseph Crescenzo for their invaluable
research assistance. I also wish to thank the Southeastern Association of Law Schools
("SEALS") for allowing me to present an earlier version of this Article as part of the 2007
New Scholars Workshop. Thanks also to the Wake Forest University School of Law for its
generous support. All errors or omissions are my own.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Literary Classics 2004) (1835).
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implementation andpermanence of the reforms. This Article advocates that
in order to ensure broader stakeholder participation in the context of
DOJ's enforcement of§ 14141, DOJshouldformally adopt the paradigm of
regulatory negotiation, a process that has been used successfully in
administrative rulemaking. Applying the regulatory negotiation model to
police reform has important implications such as greater cooperation
among those implementing the reforms and the creation of innovative
solutions to address police misconduct that are specifically tailored to the
respective community.
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 21, 2006, after obtaining a "no knock" search warrant
based on false information, several Atlanta police officers stormed into the
home of ninety-two-year-old Kathryn Johnston.2 Ms. Johnston, who lived
alone and feared a home invasion, always locked her door and kept a gun
for protection.3 When the officers burst unannounced into the home, Ms.
Johnston fired a single shot but struck no one.4 Officers at the scene,
however, returned fire, striking Ms. Johnston multiple times and fatally
wounding her.5 When a search of the home revealed no drugs, rather than
leaving the scene, one of the officers planted in the basement three bags of
marijuana seized in an unrelated case. 6 The officer then filed a false
incident report stating that someone had purchased drugs at Ms. Johnston's
home earlier in the day.7 To conceal their crimes, the officers suggested to
Atlanta homicide investigators that Ms. Johnston's shooting death was
justifiable. 8 Fortunately, in later interviews with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, one of the officers admitted their wrongdoing. 9 With their
criminal conspiracy revealed, two of the three officers involved pleaded
2

Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Three Atlanta Police Officers Charged in Fatal

Shooting of Elderly Atlanta Woman (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2007/April/07.crLt299.html [hereinafter U.S. DOJ Apr. 26 Press Release].
3 Tighten Rules on "No-Knock, " MACON TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Mar. 5, 2007, at A.

4 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Three Atlanta Police Officers Charged in Connection
with the Fatal Shooting of an Elderly Atlanta Woman, at 3 (Apr. 26, 2007), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/2007/04-26-07.pdf [hereinafter N.D. Ga. Apr. 26 Press

Release].
5 Ms. Johnston sustained multiple gunshot wounds and several officers were injured by
the shots fired from their fellow officers. Id. at 3-4.
6 Id. at 4. Officer Jason Smith and another officer disposed of the remainder of the
seized marijuana by throwing it down a sewer drain. Id.
7 Id. at 3-4. Officer Smith submitted two bags containing crack cocaine that he falsely
claimed had been purchased by an informant at Ms. Johnston's home. Id.
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id.
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guilty to state and federal charges stemming from the incident in April
2007.1°

If this deplorable incident had been an isolated occurrence involving a
few wayward officers, the story may have ended here. Unfortunately, this
was not the first time several of the officers involved in Ms. Johnston's
death had made false statements in their sworn affidavits before magistrate
judges. 1 Perhaps what is even more disturbing is that, as the District
Attorney observed, the investigation following Ms. Johnston's death
demonstrated that "'many of the practices that led to her death12 were
common occurrences in this unit of the Atlanta Police Department."'
A few months after this police shooting in Atlanta, police officers
three thousand miles away also engaged in a shocking display of collective
force. On May 1, 2007, Los Angeles police officers clashed with citizens
during a peaceful immigration rally in McArthur Park. 13 When a small
group of people began throwing rocks and bottles at the police officers, the
officers responded with a barrage of rubber bullets and used batons to
disperse the protestors. 14 Forty-two people, including news media
personnel, protestors, and police were injured in the incident.' 5 Soon after
the incident, Police Chief William Bratton acknowledged the actions of
some of the officers "were inappropriate in terms of use of batons and

10Officers Gregg Junnier and Jason Smith pleaded guilty in state court to voluntary
manslaughter, violation of oath by a public officer, criminal solicitation and false statements,
and in federal court to a civil rights conspiracy violation that resulted in the death of Ms.
Johnston. Smith also pleaded guilty in state court to one count of perjury. Id. at 1. A third
officer involved in the shooting, Arthur Tesler, "was indicted on state charges of false

statements, violation of oath of office by a public officer, and false imprisonment." U.S.
DOJ Apr. 26 Press Release, supra note 2. In May 2008, a jury convicted Tesler of lying to
investigators about the shooting, and a judge sentenced him to four years and six months in
prison, six months probation, and 450 hours of community service. Associated Press,
Georgia Cop Gets 4 1/2 Years for Lying After Raid That Killed Elderly Woman, FOX
NEwS.coM, May 22, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,357241,00.htm; see also
Jeffry Scott & S.A. Reid, 5 Years for Officer in Botched Raid, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23,
2008, at El.
11According to information presented in court, Officers Junnier and Smith, as well as
other Atlanta Police Department officers, previously falsified affidavits for search warrants
in order to meet the department's performance targets. N.D. Ga. Apr. 26 Press Release,
supra note 4, at 3.
12 Id. at 2.
13 Patrick McGreevy & Richard Winton, Report Cites Police "Breakdown" at May
Rally, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at Al.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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possible use of non-lethal rounds fired," and he later attributed the incident
to a "breakdown in communication" among supervising officers. 16
The fatal shooting of Kathryn Johnston in Atlanta and the Los Angeles
"May Day Melee," as it has become known, are only the most recently
publicized representations of institutional failures plaguing police agencies.
In Los Angeles, more than 100 criminal convictions were overturned and
200 people sued the Los Angeles Police Department after a police officer
disclosed that members of the police department's Rampart Division
regularly tampered with evidence and tortured suspects. 17 Nine officers
were criminally charged and twenty-three officers were fired or suspended
for their roles in the Rampart scandal. 18

16Associated Press, Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton Says Officers Used
Inappropriate Tactics During Immigration Rally, FOX NEWS.COM, May 2, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,269616,00.html.
17Andrew Blankstein, Perez Details Gang Member Framing,L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2005,
at 4. In 1998, Officer Rafael Perez, an officer with LAPD's Rampart Division gang unit,
was alleged to have used his position to procure and sell illegal narcotics. As part of a plea
agreement, Perez revealed his knowledge of widespread misconduct among other LAPD
officers including murder. Frontline:LAPD Blues (PBS television broadcast May 15, 2001),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/etc/script.html; see also
Andrew Murr, L.A. 's Dirty War on Gangs, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 72 (discussing
officer Rafael Perez's disclosure of the Rampart scandal); Todd S. Purdum, Los Angeles
Police Scandal May Soil Hundreds of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at A16 (discussing
the ramifications of the Rampart scandal).
18Patrick McGreevy, LAPD Still at Risk of Scandal Despite Reform, Panel Says, L.A.
TIMES, July 12, 2006, at 1. Of course no discussion of police reform would be complete
without mentioning the infamous police beating of Rodney King by members of the Los
Angeles Police Department. Memorialized on video, the King beating ignited an outcry for
police reform in America and a commission studying the Los Angeles Police Department in
the aftermath of the King beating found serious systemic problems that cultivated and
tolerated police misconduct. See INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT ON THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE L.A. POLICE DEPARTMENT, at vii (1991) [hereinafter
CHRISTOPHER COMM'N REPORT]. The New York City Police Department also has been the
focus of several high-profile allegations of police brutality. In 1997, police officers
sodomized Abner Louima in a police station bathroom. John Kifner, Doctors Rush Beating
Victim to Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at B1. In 1999, police fired forty-one shots at
Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African immigrant, striking him nineteen times. Michael
Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an UnarmedMan Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 1999, at Al. As he was standing in the vestibule of an apartment building, four officers
looking for a rape suspect opened fire on Diallo, killing him. Id.; see also AMNESTY INT'L,
RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY 1 (1999). Recently, the tactics of the New York
Police Department again came under fire after the shooting death of unarmed Sean Bell,
whom officers fatally shot as he left his bachelor party on the morning he was to be married.
Robert D. McFadden, Police Kill Man After a Bachelor Party in Queens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2006, at Al. On April 25, 2008, New York State Supreme Court Judge Arthur J.
Cooperman acquitted three undercover officers who had been charged in Sean Bell's death.
Michael Frazier, Panel Tackles Excess Force by Police, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at 14.
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In 1994, recognizing the need for a national response to systemic
reform of law enforcement agencies, Congress adopted 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
The statute authorizes the Attorney General to conduct investigations and, if
warranted, file civil litigation to eliminate a "pattern or practice of conduct
by law enforcement officers.. . that deprives persons of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States."' 9 Until the adoption of § 14141, there was no mechanism
available to the federal government to force local law enforcement agencies
to change their practices contributing to patterns or practice of conduct that
violated a citizen's civil rights. The Attorney General has delegated this
authority to the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of
the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), which investigates
allegations of patterns or practices of constitutional violations in order to
determine whether enforcement under § 14141 is justified. In practice, DOJ
has initiated what some experts consider only a "paucity" of lawsuits, all of
which have been resolved via court-enforced consent decrees.2z In other
jurisdictions where DOJ's investigations revealed a pattern or practice of
constitutional violations, the government has refrained from initiating
litigation and instead has opened formal investigations and entered into
negotiated agreements with the municipalities and police departments,
known as Memoranda of Agreement ("MOA").2 1 Citing the expediency
and cost-effectiveness of their settlement strategy, U.S. government
officials have expressly articulated a preference for avoiding litigation and
negotiating with municipalities to ensure compliance with the suggested
reforms.2 2 These agreements generally contain a package of reforms aimed
at enhancing greater public accountability. 3 Called the "new paradigm of
police accountability" by one commentator, the most common provisions of
The acquittal sparked citywide protests, and shortly thereafter, the House Judiciary
Committee held a public forum on police accountability. Id.
19 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000). Section 14141's grant of authority to seek injunctive relief
against local law enforcement agencies has been likened to the federal government's
intervention in civil rights cases involving school desegregation, employment discrimination,
public housing, and prison condition cases. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1384, 1402 (2000).
20 Gilles, supra note 19, at 1408 (offering possible explanations for the small number of
suits initiated by DOJ).
21 See Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18, at 18, 50 (2002) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (testimony of
Ralph Boyd, Jr., Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div.).
22

See id. at 50-52.

23

See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S.

Justice Department's "Patternor Practice" Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.
3, 6 (2003).
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these agreements are aimed at implementing or changing internal policies
related to developing early warning tracking systems to detect "problem
officers," creating use-of-force reporting systems, and devising an impartial
civilian complaint review process. 24
Notwithstanding the practical benefits of negotiating reforms for local
law enforcement agencies, DOJ's negotiation process runs contrary to the
established democratic theory that those affected by governmental policies
should have an opportunity to participate in the development of those
policies. 25 The agreements resulting from DOJ's pattern or practice
legislation have far-reaching ramifications for both the police officers
performing everyday policing tasks as well as for the community members
that the local law enforcement agencies serve. For the most part, however,
DOJ's process of fashioning the negotiated agreements has excluded these
important stakeholders. The discontent arising from such exclusion
undermines the legitimacy of DOJ's reform efforts, thereby threatening the
successful implementation and permanence of the reforms.
The goal of this Article is to devise a model of collaborative problemsolving to ensure inclusion of the interested parties, such as communitybased groups and rank-and-file officers, in the federal government's efforts
to reform local law enforcement agencies.26 Specifically, this Article
advocates that DOJ adopt the paradigm of regulatory negotiation to ensure
the inclusion of stakeholders in the development of the specific DOJmandated reforms. The participation of various stakeholders in the reform
of local police departments through the framework of negotiated
rulemaking ensures the legitimacy of the reform process, thereby increasing
the possibilities for expediting compliance with the reforms and ensuring
long-term adherence to the improved practices.
Part II of this Article describes the inception of federal pattern or
practice litigation as a response to the limitations of traditional remedies to
address police misconduct. Previously, efforts to address police misconduct
24 Id. at 6-8 (identifying DOJ's package of reforms as "the new paradigm of police
accountability").
25 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 8 (2000) ("Democratic

inclusion means that all members of the given polity should have effectively equal influence
over debate and decision-making within that polity.").
26 It is important to note that this proposed collaborative process begins only after DOJ
has found a pattern or practice of unconstitutional violations and has determined to negotiate
with the respective jurisdiction regarding reforms. Several experts have criticized the
statute's lack of a private right of action, and at least one scholar has advocated deputizing
private citizens to initiate actions. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 19. While I do not disagree
with their proposed reforms, the model I propose seeks to operate within the current
statutory parameters of § 14141 and assumes the executive retains the discretion to initiate
suit.
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have focused on punishing individual officers for misconduct and
compensating victims of police abuse. Critics have long argued that
because police misconduct must be addressed at an organizational level,
both the retrospective and individual-focused nature of the traditional
remedies account for their inability to address systemic police misconduct.27
However, there has been little evaluation of the potential for addressing
police misconduct through a collaborative process involving the affected
stakeholders. I argue that § 14141 complements the traditional remedies
because DOJ's proclivity to negotiate agreements offers an unprecedented
opportunity to include both rank-and-file-police officers and citizens in a
collaborative process to address police misconduct.
Part III examines DOJ's exercise of its "pattern or practice" authority
to date. Although widely hailed as a new tool in the arsenal against police
misconduct, police experts have expressed many valid critiques of the
legislation, including its lack of a private right of action and a perceived
lack of political will to aggressively investigate and reform problem police
departments.2 8 Part III also describes the provisions commonly included in
DOJ's negotiated agreements, including the implementation of early
warning tracking systems, use-of-force reporting systems, civilian
complaint review processes, and the appointment of an independent
monitor to oversee the implementation of the reforms.
Part IV argues that a greater, yet under-examined, deficiency of DOJ's
current enforcement of § 14141 is the exclusion of the community members
and rank-and-file police officers from the negotiation process that DOJ uses
to develop the consent decrees and MOA. The exclusion of these groups is
not only inconsistent with general norms of democratic inclusion, but it is
also inconsistent with the paradigm of community policing, which
emphasizes police-community collaboration and has become a dominant
model of policing in the United States.
Asserting that § 14141 is a potential vehicle to utilize collaborative
problem-solving in efforts to address institutional reform of local police
practices, Part V advocates a normative model of consensus-based
negotiation for use in developing future consent decrees or MOA. Part V

27 See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 453 (2004) (discussing the organizational nature of police

misconduct and the inadequacy of punishing individual police officers).

28 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 102. Specifically, several commentators have
expressly criticized DOJ's departure from seeking court-enforceable consent decrees and
question the efficacy of DOJ's conciliatory strategy to enter into negotiated agreements. Id.
This Article does not take a position with respect to determining the superiority of either
enforcement mechanism, but rather seeks to offer a workable solution to improve upon the
current negotiation process.
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argues that DOJ should formally adopt the paradigm of regulatory
negotiations in future reform efforts under § 14141 to ensure that those
impacted by the reforms are afforded the opportunity to participate in the
negotiations through their respective representatives.
Finally, Part VI considers the implications of the collaborative model
in the context of police reform, including increased political legitimacy,
greater cooperation, and better quality reforms specifically tailored to the
jurisdiction. Part VI also examines potential challenges this collaborative
model may experience in the specific context of police reform.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF "TRADITIONAL" REMEDIES IN ADDRESSING
POLICE MISCONDUCT

Even when naively dismissed as exaggerated or aberrant instances of
police wrongdoing, the Kathryn Johnston shooting, May Day Melee, the
L.A. Rampart scandal, or countless other anecdotes paint a vivid picture
about the contours of policing and police culture in a democratic society.2 9
In state and local agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, citizens filed
more than 26,000 complaints regarding police officer use of force in 2002
alone. 30 An estimated 2000 of these incidents were "sustained," meaning
that there was "sufficient evidence of the misconduct allegation to justify
disciplinary action against the subject officers."31 These figures confirm
that police misconduct is more than just a rare occurrence. Rather, citizen
abuse at the hands of those sworn to protect the public is a complex
problem without a simple cure. It is easy to identify and punish individual
rogue officers for isolated incidents of misconduct once an incident has
already occurred. But as the Johnston shooting and the May Day Melee
make clear, these events often are symptomatic of a larger problem endemic
in American law enforcement agencies.3 The culture of police violence is
29For example, the Rodney King beating involved only a few officers who actually
struck King with a baton or used a taser gun, but twenty other officers stood by and watched.
JEROME SKOLNICK & JAMES FVFE, ABOVE THE LAW 12-13 (1993). Skolnick and Fyfe observe
that the acquiescence of these officers indicated a "subculture of policing" that tacitly
endorsed such behavior. Id.
30 MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT

POLICE USE OF
abstract/ccpuf.htm.

FORCE

1-2

(2006),

available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/

31 Id. at 1.

32 It is important to note that each of the incidents mentioned above, and many of the
most publicized incidents of police misconduct over the past twenty years, have involved
victims who are racial minorities, particularly African-American males. While it is plausible
to conclude that police misconduct is often ,synonymous with racial prejudice, it is
imperative to note that the phenomenon of police misconduct in the United Sates cannot be
characterized as an entirely racial issue. As Skolnick and Fyfe make clear, this racial
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tightly woven into the institutional fabric of the police organization itself.
Therefore, police reform efforts should address not only the conduct of
individual police officers, but should also address systemic problems within
police departments that contribute to police misconduct.
When one officer is responsible for a single act of police misconduct,
there are a variety of remedial responses available to address his conduct,
ranging from judicial intervention, state prosecution of police officers,
federal prosecution of police officers, tort suits by aggrieved citizens,
internal police investigations and citizen review of police misconduct.33
But when the police organization itself is responsible for a pattern of
misconduct, these remedies have proven inadequate as catalysts for
addressing systemic problems in police departments.
A. "TRADITIONAL" METHODS OF ADDRESSING POLICE MISCONDUCT

Upon analyzing the goals and structures of traditional methods
previously used to address police misconduct, the distinction between these
methods and § 14141 becomes immediately apparent. The traditional
remedies all share one common feature-they are all centered on an
adversarial, litigation-based model. Such remedies generally focus upon
deterring police misconduct by making illegally obtained evidence
unavailable, punishing individual wrongdoers, or imposing financial
consequences upon the municipality for abuses. These remedies rarely
focus on systemic changes within a law enforcement agency to reduce and

monitor violations of citizens' rights. In contrast, § 14141 offers the
possibility for collaborative problem-solving among stakeholders to identify
problems, implement institutional reforms, and monitor progress.

dynamic was not at play at the Democratic Convention of 1968 when police clashed with
protestors, many of whom were white. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 29, at xvii. Nor can
racial animus on the part of police officers explain the violence directed at anti-war
protesters or student protesters. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK, POLITICS OF PROTEST
(1969) (discussing anti-war and student protests in the 1960s). It is likewise important to
understand that officers from racial minority groups also are not immune from misbehavior.
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supranote 29, at xvii.
33 See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISITING "WHO Is GUARDING THE

GUARDIANS?" 50-54, 64-69 (2000), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/guard/main.htm
[hereinafter REVISITING "WHO Is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?"] (summarizing legal remedies

for police misconduct); John V. Jacobi, ProsecutingPolice Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
789 (2000) (discussing the limits of federal prosecution of law enforcement officers under 18
U.S.C. § 242); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (2001) (discussing the exclusionary rule, civil rights actions,
administrative discipline, and commission reports).
Samuel Walker offers a
conceptualization of these remedies that divides them into three categories that "parallel the
three branches of American government: administrative, judicial, and legislative." Walker,
supra note 23, at 11-29.
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1. JudicialIntervention
The exclusionary rule, set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, represents the
judiciary's attempt to deter officers from producing evidence in violation of
a criminal suspect's constitutional rights by excluding evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used at trial.3 4 A byproduct of the Warren Court's "due process revolution," the exclusionary
rule is perhaps one of the most controversial doctrines in criminal procedure
because of its potential to allow "guilty" defendants to go free.35 However,
the numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule have severely limited the
doctrine's ability to deter police officers from engaging in misconduct and
have rendered the rule virtually meaningless.36 In addition to the numerous
exceptions, the effectiveness of efforts to address police misconduct such as
the exclusionary rule is limited because the rule can seek only to remedy or
deter conduct that is adjudicated. Because many citizen-police contacts are
never scrutinized by the judiciary,3 7 courts may "lack the institutional
capacity to ensure compliance on a day-to-day basis. 3 8
34367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The Supreme Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), had already prohibited the admission of illegally obtained evidence in
federal courts. The Court subsequently extended the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained
in violation of the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination and to the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (extending
exclusionary rule to Fifth Amendment violations); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964) (extending exclusionary rule to Sixth Amendment violations).
35 As Justice Cardozo famously noted, "[T]here has been no blinking the consequences.
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 150 N.E.
585, 587 (N.Y. 1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 489-90 (1976) ("The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct
review are well known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are
diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern
in a criminal proceeding."); Walker, supra note 23, at 17 (discussing how the Warren
Court's "due process revolution" generated lasting police reforms).
36 For example, Levenson explains that pursuant to Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980), courts may not address violations if the defendant does not have standing to assert
the issue. Levenson, supra note 33, at 18. She further notes that the "good faith" exception
recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), along with other exceptions to the
warrant requirement, and the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to impeachment
evidence, renders that exclusionary rule meaningless. Levenson, supra note 33, at 18.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of judicially created rules is often questioned because the
opportunities to circumvent judicially created protections are vast. Walker, supra note 23, at
18.
37For example, in 2004, federal prosecutors filed charges in district court in only
58.3% of the "criminal matters" referred to them for prosecution or investigation. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004 tbl.2.2, NJC213476 (Dec. 2006). Of the remaining 41.7% of charges, 20.2% were referred to federal
magistrates while in the other 21.5% of cases, prosecution was declined. Id.; see also
Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of
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2. Civil Remedies Available Under State and FederalLaw
Another traditional method of addressing police misconduct is through
civil litigation under state or federal law.39 Many civil actions involving
police misconduct are filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows federal
suits for damages or equitable relief where state or local governments have
deprived citizens of their constitutional rights or have violated federal law.40
Proponents of civil remedies cite advantages including lower burdens
of proof than in a criminal case, the ability of victims to initiate the lawsuit,
and the possibility of monetary compensation for the victim. 4 I Advocates

of civil suits as a strategy to address police misconduct contend the
monetary compensation for victims, if significant, may pressure local
elected officials to urge reform of local police departments. 42 However, the
tort litigation strategy has not substantially impacted police reform because
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 246, 251-52 (1980) (calculating that U.S.
Attorneys nationwide filed criminal cases in 20% to 23.4% of the "criminal matters
received" from 1974 to 1978).
38 Walker, supra note 23, at 18; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968) (noting
that many routine police functions related to evidence gathering are ill-suited to the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule). Empirical evidence also suggests that police officers
themselves are rarely deterred by the prospect that evidence may be excluded, and federal
courts also have no mechanism to determine whether police officers are even educated about
major court decisions affecting their work. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda (1996), in THE
MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 222, 230-31 (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas III eds., 1998).
39 Under state law, these suits include allegations such as false arrest, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, battery, or wrongful death. REVISITING "WHO
Is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?", supra note 33, at 64.
40 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, custom or usage of any

State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
Id.
supra note 33, at 64.
City paid nearly $70 million to
York
Watch,
New
Rights
42 According to Human
41 REVISITING "WHO Is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?",

plaintiffs alleging police misconduct between 1994 and 1996. ALLYSON COLLINS, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

304 (1998). In addition, a 1998 report claimed that the City of Chicago has paid out more
than $29 million since 1992 to settle civil lawsuits alleging police misconduct, while Detroit
has paid more than $100 million since 1986. See Robert Suro & Cheryl W. Thompson,
Group Says Police Abuses Persist Because of Lack of Prosecution,WASH. POST, July 8,
1998, at A6. By 2001, the City of Los Angeles had already paid $32 million to victims of
the Rampart scandal. Amanda Bronstad, Rampart Payouts Less Than Expected, L.A. BUS.
J., Aug. 6, 2001, at 6.
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police officers rarely experience adverse financial consequences associated
with such suits. 43 For example, municipalities pay for both the individual
officer's legal defense as well as for any penalties imposed.4 4 Furthermore,
civil actions against police officers face significant legal barriers such as the
doctrine of qualified immunity, which prevents monetary actions against
police officers acting in their official capacity. 45 A successful § 1983
prosecution requires the jury to find that the officer violated "clearly
established" law at the time of the incident. 46 As one expert noted, qualified
immunity improperly "focuses the jury's attention on what the officer
reasonably believed about the facts justifying the force used" and juries
therefore have a difficult time finding the officer liable "if the conduct is
objectively unreasonable but somehow understandable. 4 7 Additionally,
local municipalities or police unions often indemnify police officers when
they have acted in their official capacity, and thus, the police officer may
face no direct financial consequences.48 In addition to these legal hurdles,
just as with criminal prosecutions of police officers, juries often decide
credibility determinations in favor of the police officers rather than the
victim. 49 Thus, some critics believe "civil remedies are never a sufficient

form of accountability because they almost never address flawed
management, policies, or patterns of abuse, nor do they hold an individual
officer financially responsible. 50
43 Walker, supra note 23, at 18-19.
44 Id. at 19 (noting that "there appears to be a general pattern of 'disconnection and

indifference' between the police officers engaging in the misconduct and the governmental
bodies that actually assume the financial burden").
45 Armacost, supra note 27, at 469-71; Levenson, supra note 33, at 20. Despite the
barriers that qualified immunity poses for victims of police abuse, it is a necessary limitation.
The absence of such a limiting doctrine would undoubtedly create difficulties in hiring
police officers committed to protecting citizens.
46 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605-06 (1999).
47 Paul Hoffinan, The Feds, Lies and Videotape: The Needfor an Effective FederalRole
in ControllingPolice Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1506-07 (1993).
48 REVISITING "WHO Is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?", supra note 33, at 65 (citing U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN AMERICAN CITIES: POVERTY

INEQUALITY, AND DISCRIMINATION, VOLUME III: THE CHICAGO REPORT 139 (1995)); see also

Hoffman, supranote 47, at 1507; Levenson, supra note 33, at 20.
49 See, e.g., Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle ofAbuse: Why 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 is
Ineffective in DeterringPolice Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 756 n. 17 (1993).
50 COLLINS, supra note 42, at 77. For similar reasons, imposing municipal liability to
reform police practices has been unsuccessful. Municipal liability for police misconduct is
also plagued with legal barriers similar to § 1983 suits. In Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the Supreme Court rejected
respondeat superior liability, stating that a "municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor-or in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeatsuperiortheory."
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3. State and FederalCriminalProsecutionsof Law Enforcement Officers
State and federal criminal prosecutions are also available as a remedy
for police misconduct. State prosecutions of law enforcement officers are
rare. 51 In one study, entitled Shielded by Justice, Human Rights Watch
reported that prosecutors in many cities such as Chicago, Detroit,
Indianapolis, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Portland, and San Francisco
frequently have failed to prosecute officers for police brutality. 2 There is
little doubt that the dearth of state prosecutions may be related to the
inherent conflict of interest that exists between the prosecutors' offices and
the police officers upon whose work the prosecutors rely. 53 Prosecutors
may be hesitant to prosecute police officers who work in the same police
department as other officers with whom the prosecutors work closely and
rely upon to seek successful convictions in other criminal cases.
Where states fail to prosecute officers for unlawful actions, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242 allow for federal intervention. 4 Federal intervention is also
rare because DOJ officials have often asserted that state prosecution is the
preferred avenue for criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers, and
therefore federal intervention should serve only as a "back-stop. 55 By
51State criminal prosecutions resulting from violations of state laws against assault,
aggravated assault, manslaughter, and murder are another method of holding police officers
accountable. See Jacobi, supra note 33, at 803 (discussing the reluctance of police officers
to pursue investigations of fellow officers' misconduct).
52 Id. at 805-06 (citing COLLINS, supra note 42, at 2). Thus, it seems Human Rights
Watch accurately concluded that "victims of police abuse correctly perceive that criminal
prosecution... is rarely an option-except in highly publicized cases."
53 Jacobi, supranote 33, at 804.
54 Section 241 makes it unlawful for "two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States or because of his having so
exercised the same." 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000). Section 242 provides that it is unlawful for a
person acting "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, [to] willfully
subject any inhabitant of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, possession or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
55Department of Justice officials have often articulated the presumption against federal
intervention, describing § 242 as only a "back-stop" for federal prosecutions. Police
Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 131, at 3 (1991) (recording testimony of John
R. Dunne, then-Assistant Att'y Gen., Civ. Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice). Then-Acting
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Bill Lann Lee has stated,
The arm of government that principally polices the police is the local district attorneys and the
state attorneys general. It is important, however, for the federal government to have that back-up
jurisdiction, because sometimes in our nation's history, the local authorities have not prosecuted
the police when they have engaged in misconduct. That hasn't happened as a systemic matter in
many years. But it is still important that the federal government have that jurisdiction.
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most accounts, §§ 241 and 242 traditionally have been underutilized.56
According to DOJ, in fiscal year 2001, of the 6000 complaints received, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated approximately 1000
complaints. Only about 100 of those complaints resulted in federal
prosecution.5 7
The infrequency of criminal prosecutions under federal law may be
attributed to a lack of resources as well as to the many challenges associated
with these proceedings. Criminal trials are plagued with many of the same
problems experienced in civil cases, including the police "code of silence,"
where officers refuse to testify against fellow officers or, worse, hinder
investigation and prosecution by tampering with evidence and witnesses to
cover up the officer's actions. 58 As with civil trials involving police officers
as defendants, jurors in state and federal criminal cases involving police
in favor of the police officer
officers often make credibility determinations
59
instead of an unsympathetic victim.
Finally, in the rare circumstance that the federal government
prosecutes a police officer, the current statutory scheme itself serves as an
impediment to effectively addressing police misconduct. Prosecutions
Interview with Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney Generalfor Civil Rights, U.S. Dept.
of Justice,4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 119, 121 (1999).
56 See Jacobi, supra note 33, at 810 (discussing the limited number of police abuse cases
filed by DOJ when compared with the number of civil rights complaints received); see also
Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers' Licenses and Federal
CriminalProsecution:An Opportunityfor CooperativeFederalism, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 121, 126 (2003) (noting that officers who plead guilty or were convicted under federal
law represented only a fraction of the total number of complaints received). Federal
government "plays virtually no active role in holding local police accountable for abiding by
the Constitution." SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 29, at 211.
57 Goldman, supra note 56, at 126 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS (2002), availableat http//web.archive.org/web/20030207213913/
www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.html).
According to recent reports, DOJ has made modest
improvements, noting that "[iun fiscal year 2006, nearly 50 percent of the cases the Criminal
Section filed involved excessive force or law enforcement misconduct." Press Release,
Dep't of Justice, Two Former Memphis Police Officers Plead Guilty to Civil Rights
Violations (May 3, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/May/
07_crt_326.html. DOJ also reports that the Civil Rights Division "has filed 25 percent more
such cases and convicted nearly 50 percent more defendants in these cases than in the
preceding six years." Id.
58 See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 64 (2000). Gilles defines the code of
silence as referring to the "refusal of a police officer to 'rat' on fellow officers, even if the
officer has knowledge of wrongdoing or misconduct." Id. at 64. Gilles writes that the
"'code of silence' is a well-documented phenomenon" dating back to New York's Boss
Tweed gang of the 1840s. Id. at 64; see also Armacost, supra note 27, at 468 (noting that
"police officers sometimes lie about police-citizen encounters").
59 Armacost, supra note 27, at 467-68.
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under § 242 require that police officers have the specific intent to violate
the plaintiffs civil rights, as opposed to the specific intent to assault the
victim, which creates a difficult evidentiary requirement for the victim to
meet.60
4. InternalInvestigations of Police Misconduct
In order to address police misconduct, many police departments have
internal affairs divisions that oversee investigations of misconduct by
individual officers within the department. 61 Perhaps the strongest criticism
of internal police investigations is that the officers investigating these
reports have an inherent inability to conduct impartial investigations.62 In
addition, internal investigations may be less likely to result in favorable
results for claimants. For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported
that use-of-force complaints received by agencies with an internal affairs
unit were "more than twice as likely to be found not sustained than in
agencies not having an internal affairs unit., 63 Citing "lax and incomplete
investigations," low rates of substantiation of complaints, and the failure to
inform the public of the reasons for the results of complaints, critics of
internal review of police misconduct have advocated for a more transparent
process to investigate police misconduct. 64
5. Citizen Oversight
Citizen oversight of police departments transfers the investigatory
process of police misconduct allegations to an entity independent of the
police department.65 Citizen review boards, also commonly known as
60 See Jacobi, supra note 33, at 806 (discussing the evidentiary burdens of § 242's
specific intent requirement).
61 See Levenson, supra note 33, at 23.
62 As Paul Chevigny writes in his discussion of the Internal Affairs Division of New

York City's Police Department, "Superior officers did not want to root out corruption, both
because it might threaten their jobs and because they wanted to maintain a good image for
the department." PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS
79-80 (1995); see also Gilles, supra note 58, at 84-85 (discussing the lack of cooperation
experienced by police officers investigating their fellow officers).
63 HICKMAN, supra note 30, at 5.
64 CHEVIGNY, supra note 62, at 90; see also id. at 79-81 (discussing the failures of the
New York City Police Department Internal Affairs Division).
Critics of internal
investigations have also noted that these investigations tend to be "shrouded in secrecy,"
resulting in public distrust. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 18, at 6-7. This deeply held distrust
of internal investigation and discipline undermines the legitimacy of the investigatory
process. CHEVIGNY, supra note 62, at 81 (noting that police brutality investigations
conducted by internal bodies are "likely to fail"); Walker, supra note 23, at 7.
65 Samuel Walker defines citizen oversight as "a procedure for providing input into the
complaint process by individuals who are not sworn officers." Walker, supra note 23, at 5.
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civilian review boards, were created in many communities in the United
States in the 1960s with the hope that citizen review could quell the
tensions between inner-city residents and the police in those communities.66
Underlying the trend to develop citizen review boards is the argument that
greater transparency increases the political accountability of police, thereby
deterring police misconduct.67 Thus, the primary goal of these review
boards is to provide an independent review of police conduct and to combat
the insularity of internal investigations of police misconduct.6 8
Despite the value associated with increased public participation in
reviewing citizen complaints against police, like other efforts at reforming
police misconduct, citizen oversight has fallen short. Even proponents of
citizen oversight agencies argue that they are often "weak, ineffective,
poorly led, 6 9 and have had no measurable impact on police misconduct.7 °
In addition to the general critiques of the citizen oversight movement, the
retrospective nature of reviewing citizen complaints makes it particularly
ill-suited to address police misconduct before it actually occurs.7'

Nearly all of the fifty largest cities are subject to some form of citizen oversight, but the
structure and function of these review boards vary widely throughout the United States. Id.
at 21.
66 SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 29, at 220. From the beginning, citizen review boards
sparked controversy. For example, when he became Mayor of Philadelphia, Frank Rizzo
dismantled the city's citizen review board. As Skolnick and Fyfe explain, in 1966 the police
commissioner of New York, Vincent Broderick, "openly opposed the idea of civilian review
of police misconduct." Id. at 220.
67 William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 833 (2006).
68 According to figures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the presence of a civilian
complaint review board ("CCRB") seems to have an effect on percentage of citizens who
lodge complaints about police officers. For example, departments with CCRBs had a higher
rate of use-of-force complaints as compared to agencies without a CCRB. The overall rate
of citizen force complaints was 158 per agency in jurisdictions with CCRBs as compared to
18 complaints per agency in jurisdictions without a CCRB. See HICKMAN, supra note 30, at
4.
69 Walker, supranote 23, at 22.
70 Id. at 22-23; see also Richard S. Jones, Processing Civilian Complaints:A Study of the
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, 77 MARQ.
since their inception, review boards have achieved
stated that whether citizen review may be deemed
structure of the agency and the powers with which it

L. REV. 505, 505 (1994) (stating that
only moderate success). Walker has
effective "depends" upon the formal
is invested. SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE

ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT

187 (2001). For example, New York

City's CCRB is invested with subpoena powers which it used to obtain information relevant
to the proceedings such as medical records, accident reports, and tape recordings of police
communications. Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, I OnO ST.
J. CRiM. L. 653, 655 (2004).
71 See Livingston, supra note 70, at 655 (noting this retrospective investigation of
complaints is inadequate to identify and prevent police misconduct).
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Despite the failures of the traditional methods to curb police
misconduct, many of the remedies have intrinsic values that should not be
overlooked.72 The traditional methods used to address police misconduct
focus on determining culpability and compensating victims; this focus is
both necessary and admirable. Thus, advocates of police reform should not
jettison these efforts or fail to improve their effectiveness addressing police
misconduct. However, the retrospective nature of the "traditional" reforms
and their focus on the misdeeds of individual officers are often blamed for
the failure of these remedies to result in widespread cultural changes in
police organizations.
B. EMPHASIZING ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM OF POLICE
DEPARTMENTS

In recent years, there has been renewed evaluation and debate about
the nature and causes of police misconduct, and many experts agree that the
roots of police misconduct rest within the organizational culture of
policing.7 3 In the aftermath of the Rodney King beating, the Christopher
Commission concluded in its July 1991 report that "there is a significant
number of officers in the LAPD who repetitively use excessive force
against the public. 74 The Commission also found that police department
management condoned this behavior through "a pattern of lax supervision
Recent scholarship
and inadequate investigation of complaints. 75
demonstrates police officers are not "independent agents" of the police
72 Alexa Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for
Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 712-16 (1996) (discussing the inherent value of
criminal prosecution of police officers).
73 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18 (discussing the LAPD's
management culture and its relation to police misconduct); COLLINS, supra note 42, at 1, 33,
45 (reporting that many of the problems identified in police departments across the nation
had an organizational component); Armacost, supra note 27, at 493-94 (detailing the
organizational roots of police brutality).
74 CHRISTOPHER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at iii, 31. The Commission further
elaborated that
[t]he failure to control these officers is a management issue that is at the heart of the problem.
The documents and data that we have analyzed have all been available to the department; indeed,
most of this information came from that source. The LAPD's failure to analyze and act upon
these revealing data evidences a significant breakdown in the management and leadership of the
Department. The Police Commission, lacking investigators or other resources, failed in its duty
to monitor the Department in this sensitive use of force area.
Id. at iv.
75 See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 815, 816 (1999) (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at
398-99 (1991) (Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991, Title XII, Police Accountability Act)
[hereinafter Police Accountability Act]).
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agencies for whom they work.76 Rather, individual police officers operate
within a "powerful organizational culture that significantly influences and
constrains their judgment and conduct., 77 Thus, efforts to address police
misconduct, no matter how sincere, are doomed to fail if they consistently
emphasize the behavior of individual officers rather than address the
78
"distinctive and influential organizational culture" of police institutions.
The pivotal role of organizational culture in police reform requires
institutional change of law enforcement agencies to address effectively the
problem of police misconduct. Yet, as demonstrated above, the common
disadvantage shared by the aforementioned "traditional" remedies of police
misconduct is their focus on retrospective acts of individual instances of
police officer misconduct. The retrospective nature of the "traditional"
reforms and their focus on the misdeeds of individual officers are often
blamed for the failure of these remedies. The narrowly focused remedial
approach prompted discussion about the need for a "new paradigm of police
accountability" and has refocused efforts toward the broader goal
of
79
institutional reform rather than the malfeasance of individual officers.
III. THE NEW PARADIGM INPOLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE EMERGENCE

OF § 14141
A. THE POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1991
The Police Accountability Act of 1991, a precursor to § 14141,
exemplifies the shift away from legal remedies to address police abuse that
are premised upon rational actor theories such as criminal prosecutions and
the imposition of civil liability. 80
Although § 14141 has no direct
legislative history, as the statute's predecessor, the Police Accountability
Act's emphasis on institutional reform is relevant in understanding the
policy concerns underlying the enactment of § 14141. In 1991, prompted
by the national call for police reform precipitated by the Rodney King
beating, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings
on the excessive use of force by police in the United States to determine the
federal response. The hearings shed new light on the institutional failures
76 Armacost, supranote 27, at 476.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 455; see also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 29, at 187 (stating that "if police

reform is to be more than window dressing, it must be supported by the powerful institutions
among which police organizations exist").
79 See Walker, supra note 23, at 6.
80 See United States v. City of Columbus, No. 99CV1097, 2000 WL 1133166, at *3
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000) (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-1085 (1992), 1992 WL 396419, at *65

(Leg. Hist.)).
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within law enforcement agencies that cultivated police misconduct. In its
report, the committee noted that while police misconduct was endemic to
police departments nationwide, the U.S. government lacked the authority to
address systemic patterns or practices of police misconduct and could only
prosecute individual police officers. 81 The report recognized that "if an
officer was poorly trained, or was acting pursuant to an official policy, it is
difficult to obtain a conviction, and the Department of Justice has no
authority to sue the police department itself to correct the underlying
policy.

'82

Indeed, in United States v. City of Philadelphia,83 the court held

that the federal government does not have implied statutory or
constitutional authority to sue a local government or its officials to enjoin
violations of citizens' constitutional rights by police officers. Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 84 the House Judiciary
Committee also noted that "while a private citizen injured by police
misconduct can sue for money damages, he or she cannot sue for injunctive
relief, absent a showing of likely future harm. ' 85 Thus, the established case
law represented a "serious and outdated gap in the federal scheme for
protecting constitutional rights. 86 The committee sought to remove
barriers to injunctive relief in the Police Accountability Act, which
authorized the Attorney General of the United States to obtain civil
injunctive relief against governmental authorities for patterns or practices of
unconstitutional police practices. 87 The Police Accountability Act was
incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991, but ultimately
failed to win Congressional approval.8 8 The defeated 1991 bill, however,
81

See H.R. REP. No. 102-242 (1991),

1991 WL 206794, at

*138.

The hearings

specifically indicated widespread patterns of police misconduct in New York and Boston.
See id. at *137.
82

Id.

644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
461 U.S. 95 (1983).
85 See H.R. REP. No. 102-242 (1991), 1991 WL 206794, at
83

84

*138.

In Lyons, a Los

Angeles resident sued the City after police officers administered a chokehold that rendered
him unconscious following a routine traffic stop. 461 U.S. at 97-98. From 1975 to 1982,
sixteen people died as a result of LAPD chokeholds, while many other cities had limited the
use of a chokehold to situations where the officer's life was in peril. Id. at 116 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court held that Lyons had no standing to seek an injunction
restricting the use of chokeholds because he could not demonstrate that he himself was likely
to be choked again. If choked again, the Court allowed, he could sue for damages again, but
no individual could sue to bring the LAPD's chokehold policy in conformity with practices
accepted in most other cities. Id. at 111.
86 See H.R. REP. No. 102-242 (1991), 1991 WL 206794, at *137.
87 City of Columbus, 2000 WL 1133166, at *3.
88 Section 1202 of the Police Accountability Act was incorporated into H.R. 3371, the
Although the bill passed the House of
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991.
Representatives, after it was forwarded to the Senate it failed to achieve cloture on the
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was resurrected in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1993, which included the 1991 provision authorizing the Attorney General
to pursue injunctive relief for patterns of police abuse. 89
Section 14141 grants DOJ the authority to seek injunctive relief to
initiate reforms of law enforcement agencies where DOJ determines a
"pattern or practice" of unconstitutional violations or violations of federal
law. 90 DOJ's enforcement of § 14141 begins when DOJ becomes aware of
concerns that a local police department might be engaging in such unlawful
practices. 9' DOJ first conducts a preliminary investigation by reviewing
witness interviews and other pleadings, such as depositions or testimony, to
determine whether a pattern or practice of unconstitutional violations
exists. 92 If the preliminary investigation reveals sufficient evidence of the
allegations, DOJ then launches a formal investigation.9 3 If DOJ finds a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional violations, § 14141 gives DOJ the
authority to file a lawsuit against the law enforcement agency.94

Conference Report. After failing to achieve cloture for a second time in the Senate, the
Senate never approved the bill. See id. at *3 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-1085 (1992), 1992
WL 396419, at *65 (Leg. Hist.)).
'9 See S. 1488, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993).
Since its adoption, courts considering
§ 14141 have upheld the legality of the statute as a constitutional exercise of Congress'
power to remedy police misconduct. City of Columbus, 2000 WL 1133166, at *9.
90 Section 14141 provides:
(a) Unlawful conduct
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person
acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by
law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that
deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
(b) Civil action by Attorney General
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of paragraph
(1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil
action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).
91 Oversight Hearing,supra note 21, at 18-19 (testimony of Ralph Boyd, Jr., Assistant
Att'y Gen., Civ. Rights Div.).
92 Id. In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, then-Assistant
Attorney
General for Civil Rights Ralph Boyd compared the process to making "[a] 1983 assessment
as to whether there is some formal policy or some unspoken practice that is leading to some
level of repetitive unconstitutional uses of authority by police officers." Id. at 19.
93 id.
94 Id.
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B. DOJ'S ENFORCEMENT OF § 14141
1. Implementing Reforms via Consent Decrees
To date, DOJ has filed complaints against and entered into courtenforced consent decrees with the following local law enforcement
agencies: Los Angeles Police Department; 95 Steubenville, Ohio Police
Department; 96 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Police Department; 97 Prince
George's County, Maryland Police Department (regarding the use of
canines); 98 Detroit, Michigan Police Department; 99 and the New Jersey
State Police. 100 DOJ also filed a lawsuit against the Columbus, Ohio Police
Department but subsequently dropped the suit after satisfying itself that
Columbus was in compliance with the Constitution. 10 1
2. Implementing Reforms via NegotiatedAgreements
While the Clinton administration aggressively sought the entry of
court-enforced consent decrees, the Bush administration has completely
abandoned the use of consent decrees, thereby circumventing judicial

95 Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (June 15, 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm [hereinafter Los
Angeles Consent Decree].
96 Consent Decree, United States v. Steubenville (Sept. 3, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm [hereinafter Steubenville Consent
Decree].
97 Consent Decree, United States v. Pittsburgh (Apr. 16, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm
[hereinafter Pittsburgh Consent
Decree].
98 Prince George's County has been the subject of both a consent decree involving the
use of canines and a Memorandum of Agreement involving the police department's use of
force. See Consent Decree between the United States Dep't of Justice and Prince George's
County, Md. and the Prince George's County Police Dep't (Jan. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pgpdlpg-consenLdecree.pdf [hereinafter Prince
George's County Consent Decree]; Memorandum of Agreement between the United States
Dep't of Justice and Prince George's County, Md. and the Prince George's County Police
Dep't (Jan. 22, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pgpd/
pg.memo..agree.pdf [hereinafter Prince George's County MOA].
99 Consent Decree, United States v. Detroit, No. 03-72258 (June 25, 2003), availableat
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dpd/detroitpd-uofwdcd_613.pdf.
100 Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (Dec. 30, 1999), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm [hereinafter New Jersey Consent
Decree].
101See Letter from Ralph Boyd, Jr., Assistant Att'y Gen., to Michael Coleman, Mayor of
Columbus (Sept. 4, 2002), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/columbus
cole.boyd_letters.htm (stating that the DOJ accepted the City's recommendations for
resolving the litigation).
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review of the agreements. °2 DOJ officials maintain the government's
decisions whether to engage in litigation, seek consent decrees, or enter into
MOAs are considered on a "case-by-case basis."10 3 However, arguing that
the local agencies are more likely to "buy in" to the solution if they are
included in the process,10 4 DOJ officials articulated a preference for
resolving violations through a collaborative negotiation process, rather than

engaging in litigation or seeking entry of court orders.10 5 For example, the
then Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division, R. Alexander
Acosta, expressly stated:
Rather than adopting a purely litigation-driven enforcement model, our experience
demonstrates that a cooperative model produces much better and faster results.
Accordingly, rather than husband findings of potential violations for use in court, we
10 and progress, so that they
work hard to keep target agencies informed of our findin§s
effective solutions.
can begin to develop and implement

Illustrative of this settlement strategy are DOJ's resolutions of "pattern
or practice" investigations in Buffalo, New York;10 7 Cincinnati, Ohio;

08

the

Noting the absence of substantial compliance requirements and the departure from the
previous consent decree model, Representative John Conyers described DOJ's current policy
as a "[r]etrenchment in the area of pattern and practice enforcement under § 14141." See
Civ. Rights Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congress, at 59 (2004), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/j udiciary/hju92346.000/hju92346_0.HTM.
103 Oversight Hearing, supra note 21, at 52 (written response of Ralph Boyd, Jr. to
questions from Sen. Kennedy). To date, there are several investigations which appear to be
ongoing, including Miami, Florida; Schenectady, New York; and Portland, Maine. During
the course of these investigations, DOJ has also sent technical assistance letters identifying
areas of concern and making recommendations for improvements. See, e.g., DOJ Letter to
Frank James regarding Investigation of Alabaster Police Dep't (Nov. 9, 2004), availableat
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/split-alabaster-talet1109-04.pdf, DOJ Letter to
Kerry Drue, Att'y Gen., regarding U.S. DOJ Investigation of the Virgin Is. Police Dep't
(Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/virgin-island_
pd-talet_l 0-5-05.pdf.
104 Oversight Hearing, supra note 21, at 52 (written response of Ralph Boyd, Jr. to
questions from Sen. Kennedy).
105 For example, when Sen. Kennedy, through written questions to then-Assistant
Attorney Ralph Boyd, inquired about DOJ's proclivity to enter into negotiated agreements
rather than judicially monitored consent decrees, Boyd responded, "[T]o the extent we can
achieve compliance with the law with contractual settlement agreements that are enforceable
in court.., and do so on an expedited basis, we hope to reach such agreements at the earliest
possible date." Id. at 52.
106 Reauthorization of the Civ. Rights Div. of the U.S. Dep 't of Justice: Hearing Before
the Subcom. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 67 (2005)
(testimony and prepared statement of R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civ. Rights
Div., U.S. Dep't. of Justice), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary
/hju99784.000/hju99784_0f.htm.
107 Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and
the City of
Buffalo, N.Y. and the Buffalo Police Dep't, the Police Benevolent Ass'n, and the Am. Fed'n
102
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District of Columbia;10 9 Mount Prospect, Illinois; 110 Prince George's
County, Maryland (regarding the use of force);"' and Villa Rica,
Georgia. 1 2 Rather than initiating law suits for injunctive relief, DOJ has
resolved each of these investigations, some of which the agencies have
themselves initiated, by entering into MOAs. 113 In contrast to the consent
decrees, which are court-enforceable if the City fails to comply with its
terms, the MOA that DOJ has entered into must rely on the threat of a
future consent decree or litigation in order to encourage municipalities to
comply with the reforms.' 14 The Bush administration has also increasingly
engaged in the practice of providing "technical assistance" letters to some
law enforcement agencies that detail specific reforms the jurisdiction should
undertake. 15 It is unclear, however, as to whether these technical letters are
the final action DOJ will take in these jurisdictions and how (or whether)
DOJ will monitor the implementation of the recommended reforms." 6
of St., County, and Mun. Employees Local 264 (Sept. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/buffalo-police-agreement.htm
[hereinafter
Buffalo MOA].
108 Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and the City of
Cincinnati, Ohio and the Cincinnati Police Dep't (Apr. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.htm [hereinafter Cincinnati MOA].
109 Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and the D.C. Metro.
Police Dep't (June 13, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/
dcmoa.htm [hereinafter D.C. MOA].
110 Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and the Village of Mt.
Prospect, Ill., availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/mtprospect-moa.pdf.
111Prince George's County MOA, supra note 98.
112 Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and the City of Villa
Rica, Ga. (Dec. 23, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/
villa rica-moa.pdf.
113 Several jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, Cincinnati, and Detroit, have
invited DOJ to make an assessment of their police practices.
114 See, e.g., D.C. MOA, supra note 109,
185 (noting that if DOJ determines that the
failure to fulfill any obligation under the agreement has not been cured, DOJ may file an
action in federal District Court against the City and the Police Department for breach of
contract; the MOA provides that DOJ may then seek specific performance of the agreement).
115 According to a 2006 report detailing the activities of the Civil Rights Division, DOJ
had sent nineteen such technical assistance letters and provided hundreds of hours of
technical assistance to law enforcement agencies in the previous five years. See U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Civil Rights Division Activities and Programs (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.html. DOJ's Civil Rights Division's website currently
reflects that DOJ has sent technical assistance letters to jurisdictions including Bakersfield,
California; Miami, Florida; Schenectady, New York; Portland, Maine; Alabaster, Alabama;
Beacon, New York; Warren, Ohio; and the Virgin Islands. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
116 The letters typically indicate that the recommendations in the letter are "not
exhaustive" and that while DOJ has found no "pattern or practice" of violation as of yet, the
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C. COMMON REFORMS INCLUDED IN CONSENT DECREES AND

NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS PURSUANT TO § 14141
DOJ's propensity to procure reforms through consent decrees, and
more recently through negotiated settlement agreements, has made the
resulting MOA and consent decrees the most important tools in DOJ's
enforcement of § 14141. Although the provisions of the consent decrees
and MOA are determined in part by the problems peculiar to the respective
police department and jurisdiction, they reflect common practices designed
to enhance the accountability of the local police department. 1 7 A key
component of the agreements is the emphasis on administrative rulemaking
as a tool to guide officers' conduct in the field, establish investigatory
protocols, and implement supervisory review. 1 8 The most common
provisions, which are drawn from a list of "best practices" developed by
DOJ in conjunction with police practices experts, include the development
of an early intervention system, collection of use-of-force reporting,
and
1 9
development/improvement of a civilian complaint review process."
1. Implementing an Early Warning Tracking System
Identifying officers who exhibit a pattern of misconduct can have a
significant impact on the occurrence of unconstitutional violations within
the department as a whole. Therefore, many of the MOA and consent
decrees developed pursuant to § 14141 stipulate that the particular police
department must devise and implement an Early Warning Tracking System
or Early Intervention System to identify "problem" officers within the
department. 120 Essentially, the early warning tracking systems, or early
intervention systems, operate as a "risk management" tool for the police
departments.
The need for such a risk management tool is based upon the concept
that a small number of the same police officers within a department are
government's "fact-gathering process" is not yet complete. See, e.g., Investigation Letter
from Shanetta Y. Cutlar to Virginia Gennaro (Apr. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/bakersfield-ta-letter.pdf.
117 See Livingston, supra note 75, at 818; Walker, supra note 23, at 7.
118 See Walker, supra note 23, at 14 (noting that administrative rulemaking "lies at the
core of the new paradigm of police accountability").
119 Id. at 6-7. The principles set forth in DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING
POLICE INTEGRITY: EXAMPLES OF PROMISING POLICE TACTICS AND POLICIES (2001), available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojp/186189.pdf [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES
FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY], are focused upon promoting civil rights integrity. Many
of these same principles form the basis of the reforms required in the consent decrees and
MOA developed by DOJ under § 14141. See Walker, supra note 23, at 7.
120 During initial investigations, DOJ has also recommended to several jurisdictions that
they implement early warning tracking systems.
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typically responsible for the majority of the department's reports of police
misconduct. 121 Most illustrative of this phenomenon is the Christopher
Commission's analysis of complaints involving 1800 Los Angeles police
officers between 1986 and 1990.122 According to the Commission's report,
1400 officers had only one or two allegations. However, "183 officers had
four or more allegations, 44 had six or more allegations, 16 had eight or
more allegations, and one had 16 allegations." 123 The Commission found
that "[t]he top 5% of officers ranked by number of reports accounted for
more than 20% of all reports, and the top 10% accounted for 33%. " 124 Even
if only a small number of officers are involved, these figures implicate a
need for reform at an organizational level, because they indicate that little is
being done at a departmental level to identify, discipline, or retrain these
officers in an effort to improve their performance. In fact, evidence
supports the assertion that, despite displaying a pattern of misconduct,
many of these "problem" officers in Los Angeles avoided both negative
personnel evaluations and disciplinary action; in some instances, they may
even have been promoted. 125 To identify these patterns, the consent
decrees, or MOA governing the following police departments, contain
references to the development of an Early Warning Tracking System: Los
Angeles,

California; 126

Pennsylvania;12

8

New

Jersey

State

Police;

Prince George's County, Maryland;
132

Ohio; 130 Cincinnati, Ohio;

131

and Washington, DC.

27

29

Pittsburgh,

Steubenville,

121 CHRISTOPHER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 31; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note

29.
122 CHRISTOPHER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 36.
123

Id. Similarly, when examining the use-of-force reports involving 6000 officers from

January 1987 to March 1991, more than 4000 of the officers had fewer than five reports
each, but the Commission noted sixty-three officers had two or more reports each. See id.
124

Id.

125

For example, the Christopher Commission noted that personnel evaluations of the

forty-four officers receiving six or more complaints were generally "very positive" and
"failed to give an accurate picture of the disciplinary histories of these officers." Id. at 41.
Many of the performance evaluations did not contain any reference to sustained complaints
against the officer, prompting the Commission to note that "the picture conveyed in an
officer's personnel evaluation file was often incomplete and commonly at odds with
contemporaneous comments appearing in the officer's... complaint files." Id. For specific
examples of those inconsistencies, see id. at 42-47.
126 Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 95,
39-52.
127 New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 100,
40-56.
128 Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 97,
12.
129 Prince George's County MOA, supra note 98,
75-84.
130 Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 96,
71-77.
131 Cincinnati MOA, supra note 108, 57.
132 D.C. MOA, supra note 109, 2.
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2. Implementing Use-of-Force Reporting Systems
In addition to the Early Intervention Systems, another important
component of some of the consent decrees and settlement agreements is the
requirement that the local police agencies either develop and implement
use-of-force reporting systems or modify their existing use-of-force
policies.
The consent decrees and agreements typically address
"substantive use of force policies, incident reporting requirements, the
investigation of force incidents, and entry of force reports into a
departmental early intervention ('El') or risk management system., 133 For
example, the jurisdiction may be required to implement a use-of-force
policy that complies with "applicable law and current professional
standards." Alternatively, the MOA, or consent decree, might require
specific reforms that limit practices, such as the deployment of canines, the
134
use of particular chemical agents, or the use of certain physical restraints.
Beyond the substantive modifications of use-of-force polices,
administrative rulemaking in the various agreements extends to the
investigations surrounding these uses of force. Generally, the provisions in
the agreements are designed to correct problems in the investigation process
and to maintain the integrity and impartiality of the investigation. For
example, Prince George's MOA contains requirements related to critical
firearm discharges. 135 Not only does the MOA require the police
department to investigate all such discharges, but it stipulates that
the
136
department create a special board to review such firearm discharges.
3. Devising a Civilian ComplaintProcess
Another common provision of the consent decrees and negotiated
MOA involves improving upon the police department's existing citizen
complaint process or developing a new system to handle citizen
complaints. 137 Provisions related to the civilian complaint process generally

133 Walker,

supra note 23, at 33.

134Prince George's County MOA, supra note 98,

35-39 (detailing revisions and

augmentations to the police department's use of the chemical agent Oleoresin Capsicum,
commonly known as pepper spray).
131 Id. 46-48.
136Id. 47.

137Precedent for many of these policies may be found in DOJ's Principle for Promoting
Police Integrity which states that law enforcement agencies have an obligation to "provide a
readily accessible process in which community and agency members can have confidence
that complaints against agency actions and procedures will be given prompt and fair
attention." The report details the acceptance of misconduct complaints and states that law
enforcement officers should be required to report misconduct by other officers. See DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY, supra note 119, at 7.
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focus on facilitating the methods by which citizens can lodge a complaint.
A common provision might require the police department to allow citizens
to make complaints in writing, verbally, by mail, by telephone, by
facsimile, or by e-mail and may require the police department to provide a
twenty-four-hour telephone hotline to lodge complaints against officers.
Beyond delineating the methods for receiving complaints, a common
reform provision may stipulate the manner in which those complaints are
processed and investigated. For example, pursuant to the consent decree in
Los Angeles, the department is required to make audio or video recordings
of all complainants, involved officers, and witnesses, and are required to
38
investigate the scene of complaint incidents to secure evidence.'
4. Selection of an Independent Monitor
All of the MOA and consent decrees to date have included provisions
for the selection of an Independent Monitor, chosen together by the city, the
law enforcement agency, and DOJ. The Independent Monitor is charged
with reviewing and reporting on the police department's implementation of
the agreement.
D. CRITIQUES OF DOJ'S ENFORCEMENT OF § 14141
Because of the relatively small number of jurisdictions in which DOJ
has exercised its § 14141 authority, many discussions about § 14141 begin
with the caveat that the statute's effectiveness is largely untested. 139 To
date, there has yet to be a comprehensive empirical analysis to determine
whether federal intervention has actually resulted in decreased use of
inappropriate force or greater accountability across all of the law
enforcement agencies in which it has been enforced.1 40 Despite the lack of
empirical data, DOJ's willingness to intervene in certain jurisdictions may,
however, encourage other jurisdictions to make improvements in existing
policies and practices. 141

138 Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 95,
139

80(a) & 80(b).

See Gilles, supra note 19, at 1407-08; Jacobi, supra note 33, at 834; Livingston, supra

note 75, at 817.
140 There has not been any study of § 14141's effectiveness across the aggregate
jurisdictions subject to federal oversight under § 14141.
However, through field
observations, interviews with key officials, focus groups, and surveys, the Vera Institute of
Justice found that in the year following the termination of the consent decree, the Pittsburgh
Police Bureau was able to sustain many of the reforms it accomplished under the decree.
See ROBERT C. DAVIS, CHRISTOPHER ORTIZ & NICOLE J. HENDERSON, CAN FEDERAL
INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING: THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT

DECREE 41 (2005), availableat http://www.vera.org/publications-5.asp?publicationid=277.
141 See Gilles, supra note 19, at 1407.
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1. Lack of "Aggressive" Enforcement
The relatively small number of targeted police departments has
prompted some concern among observers that DOJ is not exercising its
enforcement authority under § 14141 aggressively enough. Critics of
DOJ's enforcement strategy note that DOJ has filed only a "paucity" of
actions against law enforcement agencies. 142 Ironically, the initial lawsuits
were filed in smaller cities, while many major urban areas with a history of
highly publicized police corruption and misconduct have not been targets of
federal reform. 143 New York City, for example has had a number of highprofile incidents of police misconduct but DOJ has not yet filed suit against
the New York City Police Department. Indeed, after the 1997 police
beating of Abner Louima, the federal government appeared to be in
"negotiations" with New York City about reforming its police department.
Yet ten years later, the New York City Police Department is still not subject
to a consent decree or MOA. 144 The failure to intervene more quickly in
larger, traditionally troubled jurisdictions has prompted some critics to
suggest that perhaps DOJ has focused only
on smaller jurisdictions that are
145
easily amenable to federal reform efforts.
There are also questions regarding DOJ's ability to properly identify
"problem" police departments because of difficulties in obtaining reliable
information about the department. For example, as part of its initial
investigation to determine whether a "pattern or practice" of
unconstitutional violations exists, DOJ relies heavily on records of the law
enforcement agencies themselves, which are often inaccurate and
142
143

Id. at 1408.
For example, DOJ has tended to target its investigations on smaller localities rather

than on large urban centers. The Pittsburgh Police Bureau, which was one of the first
agencies against which DOJ filed suit, employs roughly 1000 officers to serve approximately
336,000 citizens, and Steubenville, the subject of another DOJ suit, has a population of about
19,000 citizens. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS

(2002), available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/

Search/Law/Law.cfm. In contrast, Chicago, employing 13,466 officers to serve 2,927,391
people, and New York City, employing 40,435 officers to serve a population of 8,087,000,
are not, at least publicly, currently under investigation pursuant to § 14141. Id.; see also Eric
Lichtblau, US. Low Profile in Big-City Police Probes Is Under Fire: Critics Say Justice
Department Boldly Pursues Misconduct Cases in Smaller Towns but Goes Slow on Larger
Inquiries, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al (quoting Steubenville's then-City Manager, who
stated, "You see all of these problems that have come up at the police departments in Los
Angeles and New York and New Orleans, and you've got to wonder, why us?").
144 See Kevin Flynn, Wild Card in Police Oversight Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2000, at
B3 (noting that New York City balked at entering into a consent decree with the federal
government to implement reforms of the police department).
145 Gilles, supra note 19, at 1408 (describing the smaller jurisdictions as the "low
hanging fruit" of DOJ's enforcement strategy).
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incomplete. 146 Furthermore, there is a concern that § 14141 does not
capture many instances of police misconduct because it reaches only
allegations that the police department has engaged in a "pattern or practice"
of misconduct. There are innumerable egregious instances of police
147
misconduct that do not arise to a "pattern" or "practice" of misconduct.
Victims in these jurisdictions are therefore left with the traditional remedies
because equitable and declaratory relief is unavailable under § 14141 unless
a pattern or practice of misconduct can be established.
2. Lengthy Investigation Periods
In addition to the lack of aggressive enforcement, observers have also
criticized the amount of time it takes for DOJ to initiate an investigation and
the subsequent lengthy investigation period prior to settlement. For
example, in a congressional hearing in 2002, Senator Diane Feinstein noted
that it had taken a year for DOJ to even authorize the investigation of the
Schenectady, New York Police Department. Nearly five years later, this
investigation does not appear to be resolved. 48 In addition to the
investigations settled through consent decrees or MOA, as of January 2003,
DOJ was reported to be investigating several other agencies, including
Charleston, West Virginia; Cleveland, Ohio; Eastpointe, Michigan; Miami,
Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York (one investigation
involving use of force and another regarding the stop and frisk practices of
the street crimes unit); Portland, Maine; Providence, Rhode Island;
149
Riverside, California; Schenectady, New York; and Tulsa, Oklahoma.
While it is unclear to what extent these particular investigations have
continued, many of these investigations were initiated as early as 1999 or

146 Armacost, supra note 27, at 531.
147 The term "pattern or practice" has yet to be defined in the context of police reform,

but the Supreme Court has suggested in the Title VII context that "pattern or practice"
denotes something more "than the mere occurrence of isolated or accidental or sporadic
[unlawful] acts." Livingston, supra note 75, at 822-23 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 & n.16 (1977)). Livingston interprets this to mean that a
"pattern or practice" of conduct by law enforcement officers depriving citizens of
constitutional or statutory rights "likely denotes a course of conduct 'that is standard
operating procedure' within a police department." Id. at 822-23; see also Jacobi, supra note
33, at 834.
148 Letter from DOJ to Michael T. Brockbank, Schenectady Corporate Counsel, re:
Investigation of Schenectady Police Department (Mar. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/schenectady-ja.pdf.
149 DOJ Special Litigation Section, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/split/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
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earlier, and
have yet to be either dismissed or resolved through a
1 50
settlement.
3. Lack of Political Will to Intervene in Local Police Practices
In its enactment of § 14141, Congress granted sole discretion to the
executive branch to initiate suits enjoining unconstitutional practices.
Noting several problems associated with this lack of a private right of
action, at least one observer has advocated amending the statute to allow
private citizens to sue police departments for injunctive relief.' 5' Most
notably, a problem associated with the lack of a private right of action is
that this leaves enforcement of the statute subject to the political whims and
priorities of the political administration in power. 5 2 Because policing and
the regulation of police practices are traditionally local functions, the
federal government historically has resisted intervention. Thus, rigorous
federal intervention efforts may be politically unpopular in local
jurisdictions that are unaccustomed to federal oversight. As a presidential
candidate, President George W. Bush capitalized on the fear of federal
encroachment and proponents of § 14141 understandably became
concerned about the fate of the legislation. While courting the Fraternal
Order of Police, then-Presidential candidate Bush vehemently stated he did
not believe the "Justice Department should routinely seek to conduct
oversight investigations, issue reports, or undertake other activity that is
designed to function as a review of police operations in states, cities and
towns." 153 President Bush further stated that he "[did] not believe that the
federal government should instruct state and local authorities on how police
department operations should be conducted, becoming a separate internal
affairs division."'' 54 These statements signaled, at the very least, the
possibility that the Bush administration might be reluctant to intervene
aggressively in local police practices.
In addition, because authority to seek injunctive relief rests solely with
DOJ, enforcement of the statute is completely reliant on the limited
15o

See Livingston, supra note 75, at 816. Livingston cites to a June 8, 1999 telephone

interview she had with Mark Posner, an attorney in the Special Litigation Section, who
confirmed that DOJ was conducting investigations of police departments in Orange County,
Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; Eastpointe, Michigan; New York, New York; and
Charleston, West Virginia. Id. at n.4.
151 See generally Gilles, supra note 19, at 1388-89.
152 See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 33, at 835 (noting that "the intensity of interest in
pursuing claims against police departments will ebb and flow to a certain extent with the
changing administrations"); see also Gilles, supra note 58, at 1410-11 (noting the negative
influence of politics on federal executive enforcement of civil rights).
153 See Eric Lichtblau, Politics, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at 5.
154 See id. at 1.
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resources available within the Department of Justice.' 55 Thus, even an
administration with a commitment to aggressively enforce the legislation
would be limited to the available departmental resources. As with any
federal mandate, without adequate appropriations from Congress to fund
the enforcement of DOJ pattern or practice litigation, DOJ could be forced
to shift its priorities to other civil rights agendas.
IV. THE EXCLUSION OF AFFECTED STAKEHOLDERS IN DOJ's REFORM OF
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

As demonstrated above, the existing critiques of § 14141 primarily
focus on quantifiable factors such as the number of departments affected or
the length of time that passes between investigation and the initiation of the
reform process. However, my critique argues that a more viable starting
point for evaluating the efficacy of the legislation should focus on efforts to
assure the legitimacy and sustainability of the proposed reforms. One early
criticism of DOJ's reform efforts pursuant to § 14141 is that the statute
lacked "any overall philosophy that should guide the delivery of police
services.',156 This critique remains true today. As Debra Livingston
poignantly noted of the first two consent decrees in Pittsburgh and
Steubenville, many of the reforms included in those consent decrees
emphasized adherence to professional standards related to training,
discipline, and supervision, but the decrees included no mechanism to
actively include community members as part of the accountability reform.
The early consent decrees only foreshadowed what was to become
commonplace in DOJ's later enforcement of § 14141. To date, none of the
subsequent consent decrees or MOA enumerates a role for community
members who are the recipients of the police department's services.
Similarly, police union representatives are habitually absent from the
negotiation process through which the reforms are developed.1 57 While

155See Armacost, supra note 27, at 531 (noting that "the Justice Department lacks the
resources to monitor all police departments nationwide"); Gilles, supra note 19, at 1409-10
(noting that in 1999 only twenty-six attorneys worked in the Special Litigation Unit and that
only fifteen FBI agents were assigned to investigate local police departments patterns and
practices). Furthermore, DOJ is not a static institution and does tend to reshape its mission
based on the political administration in power. See Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Reshapes
Its Civil Rights Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at Al (noting that the Bush
Administration has "recast" DOJ's role in civil rights by focusing less on race cases and
aggressively pursuing religion-oriented cases).
156 Livingston, supra note 75, at 853.
157 See DAvis ET AL., supra note 140, at 4 (noting in the Executive Summary that "[m]ore
engagement of citizens and greater participation of front-line officers might have made a
good process better").
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there are a few notable exceptions, 158 the negotiations that have culminated
with an agreement delineating the required reforms traditionally involved
only representatives from DOJ,
city officials from the jurisdiction, and
159
police department executives.
The exclusion of police officers and community members, both of
whom represent the primary stakeholders in DOJ's police reform efforts, is
contrary to the general principle of democratic theory that those affected by
government policies should be able to participate in the decision-making
process. 160 Scholars have long argued that participation in the development
of policies enhances the political legitimacy of the resulting policy and that
those affected by government decisions should have the opportunity to
present their views and force policy-makers to consider their perspective. 161
A. THE EXCLUSION IGNORES THE INTERESTS OF RANK-AND-FILE
POLICE OFFICERS AND THREATENS THE IMPLEMENTATION
EFFORTS
Many of the common provisions discussed earlier implicate the
interests of the rank-and-file police officers. For example, the information
collected and stored in the Early Warning Tracking Systems can have
158

While police unions and community groups have not been active participants in the

vast majority of DOJ's investigations and settlements, the processes in Cincinnati represent
major departures from this model and will be discussed infra. Similarly, the MOA in
Buffalo lists the Fraternal Order as a Party to the Agreement, but it is unclear to what extent
the union representatives participated in the reforms.
159 There have been only minimal attempts on the part of DOJ to include community
members or police unions in the reform process pursuant to § 14141. In Cincinnati, tensions
over several high-profile incidents culminated with both a traditional MOA and a separate
agreement called the Collaborative Agreement, discussed infra, a document between police
and community members. The Collaborative Agreement required the City of Cincinnati to
abide by the terms of the MOA. Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C1-99-3170, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928, at *27 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2002).
Additionally, while the Buffalo MOA lists the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP") as a
party, it is difficult to discern the level of FOP's involvement in this instance. Available
documents and newspaper articles provide no details of FOP's involvement. Finally, it
appears as though DOJ had invited a police union in Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police
Protective League, to participate in formulating a database of personnel information. See
Brief of Intervenor-Appellant, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir.
2002) (No. 01-55182), 2001 WL 34093539, at *2. Despite these instances, it is clear that
DOJ has not adopted a formal policy to include community members and rank-and-file
officers in their negotiations.
160 See YOUNG, supra note 25, at 5-6 ("The normative legitimacy of a democratic
decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the
decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes.").
161 Philip Harter, NegotiatingRegulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 (1982)
(noting that "groups affected by a regulation need the opportunity to actually participate in
its development if they are to have faith in it").
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important implications for employment, promotion, and discipline of police
officers. To illustrate how the components of an early warning tracking
system might impact rank-and-file officers, it is helpful to examine, for
example, the early identification provision of the MOA between the United
States and Prince George's County Police Department ("PGPD"). The
agreement requires PGPD to expand a computerized database that will
collect and record for PGPD officers all uses of force; the number of
instances in which pepper spray, foam canisters, and ammunition for
pepperball launchers is used by officers; all injuries to prisoners; all
instances in which force is used and a subject is charged with "resisting
arrest," "assault on a police officer," "disorderly conduct," or "obstruction
of justice"; all critical firearm discharges; all complaints (and their
dispositions); all criminal proceedings, civil or administrative claims
alleging misconduct, or civil lawsuits resulting from PGPD operations or
actions of personnel; all vehicle pursuits; and all disciplinary action taken
against officers. 162 The MOA also requires PGPD to develop a protocol
that requires the automated system to generate reports on a monthly basis
and identify patterns among individual officers and units.1 63 Commanders,
managers, and supervisors are required to "initiate intervention" for
officers, supervisors, or units based on the assessment of the information
collected in the database. This intervention includes various options such
as discussion, counseling, training, and documented action plans to modify
activity.1 64 All interventions are required to be in writing and entered into
the automated system. 165 According to the MOA, the protocol will require
that the commanders, managers, and supervisors are evaluated on their
ability to enhance effectiveness and reduce risk. 16 6 The agreement also
requires the County to maintain all personally identifiable information
about officers included in the database during the officer's employment
with the PGPD and for the maximum167length of time permitted by the Law
Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights.
Similarly, the use-of-force reporting requirements in many of the
agreements may implicate the interests of rank-and-file police officers. For
example, the Los Angeles consent decree included a detailed protocol with
respect to the investigation of use-of-force incidents. Under the Los
Angeles consent decree, use-of-force investigations are to be conducted by
162

Prince George's County MOA, supra note 98,

163 Id.
164

75-76.

80.

Id.

165 Id.
166 Id.
167

Id. The Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights is set of procedural protections for

police officers codified in Md. Code Ann., Public Safety § 3-101 to 113 (2003).
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a centralized bureau, thus assuring that an officer is not investigated by
other officers in his unit.168 Notably, the Los Angeles Consent decree also
requires the department to negotiate with the police union to ensure that if
multiple officers are
involved in a shooting, they are to be represented by
169
different attorneys.
Despite the "special obligations" of police officers, 170 rank-and-file
police officers, like other employees, have an interest in "job security, fair
pay, safe working conditions, and fair and appropriate treatment by their
employers." 171 Although police management officials currently participate
in the reform process, many of the interests of police managers and the
rank-and-file officers diverge with respect to disciplinary actions against
rank-and-file officers.17 1 Police managers have an interest in maintaining
high standards of professionalism and investigating allegations of
misconduct while police officers have an interest in maintaining their
employment record. Thus, while police managers would prefer a greater
ability to question police officers about the allegations, the officers may
seek to invoke due process protections when faced with an allegation of
misconduct.1 73 Many of these protections, commonly called Law
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights ("LEOBORs"), have been included in
collective bargaining agreements and have been codified in the laws of
fourteen states. In the last few decades, police unions lobbying for these
special protections have argued, among other things, that "policing is
perhaps the only job in which people are forced to answer questions or be
fired" and the "lack of due process rights has led to a loss of officer

168Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 95,
169 Id. 60.

55-69.

170 Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185,

190-91 (2005) (discussing the dual mandate that police officers must be both fair and
effective).
171Id. at 198. Keenan and Walker note that "local and national unions are the principal
advocates for the interests of police officers." Id. at 198. Keenan and Walker note that
fourteen states have codified due process protections for officers facing official misconduct
charges. These protections are commonly called the Law Enforcement Officers' Bills of
Rights ("LEOBORs"). Similar protections, while not codified in state law, also exist in
collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 185-86.
172 See SAMUEL WALKER, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON POLICE PATTERN OR PRACTICE

LITIGATION: A 10-YEAR ASSESSMENT 4 (2005), available at http://www.aele.org/ppl-

summary.pdf (noting that despite the absence of police unions from reform efforts
throughout the years, the unions and collective bargaining agreements "not only have a
profound impact on the implementation of consent decrees and MOA but on police
accountability in general").
173 Keenan & Walker, supra note 170, at 199-200.
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confidence in the disciplinary process and a loss of morale."' 74 Many of the
reasons offered in support of these LEOBORs support the notion that rankand-file officers have a specific interest in efforts to address misconduct
allegations levied against them, and thus a general interest in the broader
context of police reform. Accordingly, police reforms ignoring the
divergent interests of police managers and the rank-and-file officers may be
difficult to implement if the officers do not "buy in" to the reforms or if the
reforms seem inconsistent with their1 interests
as set forth in the collective
75
bargaining agreements of LEOBORs.
Rank-and-file police officers have expressed displeasure with their
exclusion from DOJ's reform process pursuant to § 14141. For example,
the Los Angeles Police Protective League ("LAPPL"), the union
representing police officers in Los Angeles, attempted to intervene in the
consent decree, arguing that intervention was necessary to protect their
"substantial legal interest in the provisions of its collective bargaining
agreement and defend against charges of misconduct." 176 Despite the
interests of these stakeholders, DOJ opposed intervention with respect to
both the community members and LAPPL. Justifying its opposition, DOJ
argued that inclusion of these stakeholders would "only further delay and
encumber" the litigation.1 77 The attempt of stakeholders to intervene in the
Los Angeles consent decree demonstrates that the citizens recognize their

174id.
175

at 199.

At present, the MOA developed by DOJ and the respective jurisdictions typically

contain provisions indicating that "nothing in the agreement is intended to alter the existing
collective bargaining agreements" and in states that have codified LEOBORs, the typical
MOA also states that nothing in the MOA is intended to alter the lawful authority of the
officers under the LEOBOR. See, e.g., Prince George's County MOA, supra note 98, 7-8.
In addition to enhancing the legitimacy of the reforms, having the interests of police officers
represented at the negotiations would ensure the reforms are consistent with the collective
bargaining agreements and LEOBORs and could perhaps galvanize the city to amend
collective bargaining agreements where the bargaining agreements prevented instituting
necessary reforms.
176 See Brief of Intervenor-Appellant, supra note 159, at * 18.
177 Id. at *28. In response to the community members' argument that DOJ lacked the
political will to adequately enforce the consent decree, DOJ also argued that the community
members' intervention was unnecessary because DOJ could adequately represent the
members' claimed interests. Id. at *26-27. Similarly, DOJ argued that LAPPL had no
protectable interest in the consent decree. See Brief of Appellee, United States v. City of
Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-55182), 2001 WL 34094554, at *10-15.
The Ninth Circuit ultimately permitted LAPPL to intervene as of right, holding that the
potential conflicts with the bargaining agreements constituted a protectable interest. See City
of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 400-01. The court, however, denied intervention as of right with
respect to the community members and remanded the case for determination as to whether
the community members should be granted permissive intervention. See id. at 402-03.
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interests in reforming police practices and evince a desire to become
involved in that process.
Of course, efforts to protect the rights of police officers should not be
allowed to invalidate important reforms designed to remedy a pattern of
constitutional violations. However, ignoring these interests and failing to
make allowances where appropriate may actually hinder the reform effort.
Police reform efforts are doomed to fail without significant cooperation of
the police officers themselves, thus providing further justification for
ensuring the participation of rank-and-file officers in police reform
efforts. 78 As Debra Livingston predicted in an early discussion of § 14141,
"police reform works best when the police department itself can be brought
along."1 79 Still, others contend police reform will be reduced to mere
"window-dressing" without the support of police organizations
themselves.180 Thus, rank-and-file officers should be allowed a place at the
negotiating table and should be afforded an opportunity to have their
perspective considered during the reform process. As active participants in
the negotiation process, however, representatives of rank-and-file police
officers could add value by asserting their interests and participating in a
dialogue about creating a solution that protects the interests of the
officers. 8 1 The challenge is to implement a process that achieves this
participation without sacrificing the reforms necessary to remedy the
pattern or practice of constitutional violations.
Even though the common provisions in some instances may conflict
with the interests of rank-and-file officers, DOJ has failed to adopt a formal
process to ensure the ability of these groups to participate and influence the
negotiations. To the extent the reforms do not appear to be legitimate, there
is a risk that constituencies will become distrustful of federal intervention.
This distrust and failure to "buy in" to the reforms may undermine the
government's efforts to protect citizens' constitutional rights. Concerns
regarding the political legitimacy of these policies are particularly
heightened when the federal government intervenes in local policing, which
has traditionally been the exclusive domain of state or local government.' 82

See Livingston, supra note 75, at 848 (noting that police reform is most effective
"when the police organization itself is involved in the process, and ultimately when reform
involves not simply adherence to rules in the face of punitive sanctions, but a change in the
organizational values and systems to which both manager and line officers adhere").
179 Id. at 851.
180 SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 29, at 187.
181 For a general discussion on the competing interests of police officers, police
managers, and the public, see Keenan & Walker, supra note 170, at 197-203.
182 See DAVIS ETAL., supra note 140, at 2.
178
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The Vera Institute of Justice's study of the Pittsburgh Police
Department's experience with a consent decree pursuant to § 14141 best
exemplifies the importance of "political legitimacy" in DOJ's reform of
local law enforcement agencies. 183 Many of the officers surveyed after the
Pittsburgh consent decree noted that they experienced "low morale"
because they felt excluded from the reform process. 184 Many officers
mentioned that they were "afraid" to engage in certain behavior because
they feared negative employment repercussions. 85 Although some would
deem the Pittsburgh Consent Decree a "success," some portion of the police
force was clearly adversely impacted by its exclusion from the process.
The experience of these officers demonstrates the potential detrimental
impact of stakeholder exclusion in DOJ's current reform process.
B. THE REFORMS PURSUANT TO § 14141 IMPLICATE THE INTERESTS OF
COMMUNITY MEMBERS
The interests of community members in efforts to reform police
practices are obvious. Residents living in the affected communities are the
consumers and direct beneficiaries of the police department's services. In
addition, community groups often represent the interests of local residents
that lobby for reform of the local police agencies. Thus, community
members have an interest in ensuring that the reforms stipulated by DOJ
186
will be timely implemented in a manner that meets their expectations.
Despite the community groups' interests, like the rank-and-file police
officers, DOJ has excluded local community groups from participating
directly in their negotiations pursuant to § 14141.
In several instances, however, community members have attempted to
insert themselves into the dialogue between DOJ and local law enforcement
agencies. For example, prior to the entry of the consent decree between
DOJ and the City of Los Angeles, several community groups filed a motion
to intervene as of right in the consent decree process. 187 The proposed
intervenors were distrustful of the negotiation process and complained that
183 See

184
181

id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16-17.

186

To be sure, there are residents in these communities who feel their interests are not

aligned with residents who advocate for increased oversight of the police. My intention is
not to assume a monolithic definition of community, or to exclude the interests of this subset
of community members in any way. Rather, the interests of this subset of community
members are likely aligned with those of the rank-and-file officers who are better situated to
know what types of policies are too impractical to effectuate public safety goals.
187 The community groups included individuals who had been victims of police
misconduct, as well as the ACLU, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Asian
Pacific American Legal Center, and Radio Sin Fronteras.
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DOJ engaged in "secret" negotiations with the city officials. The proposed
intervenors also criticized the length of time that had passed between the
City's approval of the consent decree and entry of the order, noting that
neither the City nor DOJ attempted to accelerate the process. 8 8 Despite the
desire of the community members to intervene in the consent decree, DOJ
opposed that intervention, stating that it would delay the proceedings.1 89
Critics may assert that elected representatives should be presumed to
adequately represent the interests of their constituent community members.
One might argue that individuals in communities where DOJ's
investigations have revealed patterns of constitutional violations are
represented in the reform process as long as their elected representatives are
involved and working with DOJ to remedy the problems.1 90 The above
example from Los Angeles, however, highlights the inherent tension
present in a representative democracy. Even in a representative democracy
like the United States, only a small number of people are entrusted with the
policy-making decisions for the greater majority. 191 In order to fully ensure
the political legitimacy of certain policies, particularly those as divisive as
police reform, citizens should be afforded the opportunity to participate in
aspects of the political process that extend beyond merely electing their
representatives. In order to ensure that the myriad viewpoints involving the
reform of police services in a community are adequately considered,
community members should have the opportunity to participate directly in
192
the reform process when feasible.
C. EXCLUSION OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY PREVENTS COMMUNITYPOLICE COLLABORATION AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
COMMUNITY POLICING RATIONALE
In addition to ignoring general democratic notions of inclusion, DOJ's
enforcement of § 14141 ignores the concepts underlying the model of
community policing. Community policing theories have become prevalent
See Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 0 1-55453, (9th
Cir. June 13, 2001). For the full opinion, see United States v. Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391
(9th Cir. 2002).
189 The Ninth Circuit eventually denied the community members' intervention as of right
but remanded the decision to determine whether they should be allowed to permissively
188

intervene. Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 404.

190 Indeed, officials from the mayor's office are present at the negotiations, and the
"City" is typically a signatory to the MOA. See, e.g., Buffalo MOA, supra note 107; D.C.
MOA, supra note 109 (each MOA listing the respective city as signatories).
191 See Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participationand
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv 449, 479 (1988).
192 See id. at 476-82 (discussing the rationale for direct participation in political
processes).
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in the discourse of policing over the last few decades. Community policing
policies are characterized in part by the value they place on policecommunity partnerships.1 93 Police experts have long noted the value of
cooperation between police officers and citizens with respect to crime
prevention, problem solving, and easing police-community tensions.1 94 In
the 1990s, the United States witnessed an evolution in policing that trended
away from police professionalism and moved toward encouraging policecommunity partnerships to address crime prevention. Community policing
promotes police-community partnerships to encourage crime prevention
and reciprocity between police departments and community members. 195
At the core of the community policing philosophy is the belief that
196
there should be greater reciprocity between police and community.
Generally described under the umbrella of "community policing," this new
initiative was characterized by police who were "a visible presence in
communities, oriented toward crime prevention and problem-solving, and
working toward a partnership with communities.' 97 In articulating the
concept of community-oriented policing, noted police scholar Herman
193

There is a wealth of literature discussing the various forms that community policing

might take, as well as a body of scholarship detailing both the benefits and detriments of
community policing. See Livingston, supra note 75, at 562 (reviewing the literature of
community policing). The scholarship reveals a fair amount of disagreement regarding
whether certain "community policing" techniques unfairly restrict the liberties of lowincome communities with crime problems or whether they empower inner-city residents to
address the particularized needs of those communities. Compare BERNARD E. HARCOURT,
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 16-17, 135 (2001)
(criticizing order-maintenance policing as "grounded in these categorical distinctions"
between "honest people and... the disorderly"), with Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares,
The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998), and Tracey L. Meares
& Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated ProceduralThinking: A Critique of Chicago v.
Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197 (1998). This Article does not seek to examine these
critiques, but merely asserts that there may be value in creating police-community
partnerships. Thus, DOJ's current policy of exclusion is inconsistent with the underlying
rationale of these policies and signals that DOJ is missing an opportunity to cultivate positive
police-community partnerships.
194 See, e.g., Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-Solving and Community Policing,
in
MODERN POLICING 99, 123 (1992) (arguing that community policing will result in stronger
and safer communities).
195See Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing,CAL. L.
REV. 1513, 1514-15 (2002) (discussing reciprocity).
196Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing,97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 562 (1997).
197Id. (quoting Herman Goldstein, Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential,
Basic Requirements, and Threshold Questions, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 6 (1987)).
Commentators have been careful to note that community policing initiatives vary widely in
approach, thus precluding a simplistic definition of community policing. See Livingston,
supra note 196, at 661-62.
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Goldstein advocated that police should expand their focus beyond
responding to incidents once they had occurred to a more proactive practice
of identifying the underlying causes of problems and developing
customized solutions.198 Goldstein's articulation of community-oriented
policing urged a multi-faceted approach to crime prevention, which
provided alternatives to simply arresting and prosecuting offenders. A
basic component of any community policing model is the consultation with
community groups to set priorities for policing and crime prevention in that
particular neighborhood or community. 199 Thus, the lack of police and
citizen involvement has important implications in the specific context of
policing because it is antithetical to the underlying rationale for community
policing and precludes the opportunity for police officers and community
members to work together to ease community-police tensions in their
respective jurisdictions.
V. ACHIEVING STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES THROUGH A COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE MODEL

Section 14141 creates an unprecedented opportunity for the federal
government to encourage collaborative reform of deficient police
institutions. Given the implications for rank-and-file police officers and
community members in the reform process and the desire of these
stakeholders to participate in the reform process, DOJ should formulate
regulations adopting a formal mechanism to allow for the participation of
these groups in developing and implementing reforms. The paradigm of
regulatory negotiation creates a workable framework to ensure stakeholder
participation in DOJ's efforts to reform local law enforcement agencies.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY NEGOTIATION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
Negotiated rulemaking was developed in response to the expense,
delay, and dissatisfaction associated with traditional adversarial rulemaking
This view was in tension with the prevailing norm at the time which emphasized
insulating police from the community because of fears that such close contact would result in
widespread corruption.
199 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 92 (1990) ("Community Policing requires that police be
responsive to citizen demands when they decide what local problems are, and set their
priorities."); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participationin Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 911 (2006) (noting that collaborative, open decision-making, such as some
community-policing methods, can reflect neighborhood priorities and accommodate
outsiders' concerns).
198
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in the development of administrative rules. Philip Harter advocated for
negotiated rulemaking as an alternative to the, traditional rulemaking
process, arguing that adversarial rulemaking in administrative law failed to
"provide a mechanism for deciding the inherently political issues in a
politically legitimate way. °°
Harter's justification for negotiated
rulemaking rests largely on the premise that "a participatory process would
have positive merit in and of itself because a resulting regulation would be
based on consensus of those who would be affected by it ....
In traditional rulemaking, the federal agency seeking to promulgate the
rule drafts the text of the proposed rule. After comment within the agency,
the rule is printed in the Federal Register as a proposed rule and the public
is invited to comment on the rule. After reviewing the comments, the
agency evaluates issues identified during the comment period and may
choose to revise the rule. The final rule is then published in the Federal
Register and is later incorporated into the government's Code of Federal
Regulations.20 2 Harter argues that the traditional rulemaking process "has
marched steadily toward reliance on the judiciary to settle disputes and
away from direct participation of affected parties."20 3 Noting that the
inherently political questions raised in rulemaking had "resulted in a crisis
of legitimacy that is the current malaise," Harter advocates consensus-based
regulatory negotiation as a framework to ensure public participation in the
rulemaking process.20 4

200See Harter, supra note 161, at 18 (advocating the use of consensus). Regulatory
negotiation is a specific illustration of collaborative governance theories.
201 Id.

202See Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practiceof Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 134-35 (1985) (describing the traditional rulemaking
process).
203Harter, supra note 161, at 113.
204 Id. at 17.
The Administrative Conference of the United States based its
recommendation in favor of negotiated rulemaking upon Harter's article. Recommendation
82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1983),
reprinted in

ADMINISTRATIVE

CONFERENCE

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES,

NEGOTIATED

RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 11 (David M. Prizker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1995). The
term "regulatory negotiation," or "reg-neg," as it is often called, is sometimes referred to as
"negotiated rulemaking." There is some debate regarding the meaning of these terms.
Harter views the two terms as synonymous. Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The
Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 n. 1 (2000); see
also Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DuKE L.J. 1255, 1256. n.6 (1997) (noting that federal law defines
"negotiated rulemaking" as "rulemaking through the use of a negotiated rulemaking
committee[,]" and such a committee is in turn defined as "an advisory committee established
by an agency ...to consider and discuss issues for the purpose of reaching a consensus in
the development of a proposed rule," while regulatory negotiation is a general term referring
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In contrast to traditional administrative rulemaking, Harter's version of
negotiated rulemaking begins with a negotiation process that occurs prior to
the agency's issuance of the proposed regulation. The agency convenes a
committee comprised of representatives of interested parties, including
regulated firms, trade associations, citizen groups, other interested
organizations, and the staff of the agency to negotiate the text of the
proposed rule.2 °5 The goal of negotiated rulemaking is to provide an avenue
for the groups to draft the text of the rule through consensus. If a consensus
is not reached, then the agency will proceed with its normal rulemaking
activities.2 °6 There are various benefits to negotiated rulemaking when
compared with traditional rulemaking, including decreased time and
expense associated with developing the regulation, improved quality of
regulations issued, and fewer post-issuance legal challenges to the
regulations.2 °7
B. THE POTENTIAL OF THE "NEW PARADIGM" OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY AS A VEHICLE FOR COLLABORATIVE POLICE
REFORM
1. DOJ'sPolice Reform Process Pursuantto § 14141 Is Well Suited to a
CollaborativeNegotiation Process
Many of the benefits associated with regulatory negotiation in the
administrative rulemaking context are equally relevant in the context of
police reform through DOJ's pattern or practice litigation. First, one of the
major justifications for negotiated rulemaking was the acknowledgement
that inherently political issues were ill suited for the adversarial process and
inappropriate for courts to decide.20 8 Advocates of regulatory negotiation
therefore argue that a consensus-based model is superior in resolving
certain concerns. Given the polycentric concerns involved in addressing
systemic police misconduct and the wide range of acceptable solutions,
to multiple forums in which agency officials discuss rules with the public and may not
necessarily be "negotiated rulemakings").
205 Harter, supra note 161, at 70.
206 This process is summarized in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 561-570 (1994 & Supp. V. 2000), which codifies the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996).
207 Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate,
29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 179, 196 (2005).
208 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 202, at 134 (noting that
courts are
"inappropriate arbitrators of technically complex regulatory disputes"); see also Philip
Harter, The PoliticalLegitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U. L.
REv. 471,474 (1983) (discussing the inability of courts to adequately handle complex factual
questions).
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police reform is an inherently political exercise which makes it particularly
ill suited to the adversarial process. For example, once DOJ has already
found a pattern or practice of constitutional violations within a particular
department, the question is not whether to remedy the violations; the
legislation mandates injunctive relief. The more important question
becomes how to effectuate reforms that are consistent with these goals.
There may be numerous acceptable alternatives making it difficult for a
neutral third party to decide one way or another. 20 9 Determining whether or
not a jurisdiction should be mandated to have a complaint process might be
an issue easily resolved through adversarial litigation. Fashioning a
satisfactory process detailing how that complaint process should be
implemented, however, involves multiple concerns and is best achieved
through negotiation. 210 These are precisely the issues DOJ is grappling with
when seeking to reform the policies and practices of local law enforcement
agencies.
2. Cincinnati'sPolice Reform Efforts Exemplify PotentialforCollaborative
Reform of Police Practices
Cincinnati, Ohio's efforts to implement systemic police reforms
illustrate the potential for collaborative reform of police practices in the
context of DOJ's enforcement of § 14141. Following the 2001 fatal
shooting of an unarmed African-American man in Cincinnati, the city
erupted in riots. This shooting represented the fifteenth fatal police
shooting of an African-American within a six-year period. The 2001
shooting precipitated DOJ's investigation pursuant to § 14141, which found
a pattern of constitutional violations within the Cincinnati Police
Department. 211 On March 15, 2001, the Ohio chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union joined with the Cincinnati Black United Front to initiate a
209 See Harter, supra note 208, at 475 (stating that, because political choices have no
"right" or "wrong," this leads to "contradiction in the legitimacy of regulations").
210 Greater transparency in the complaint process may be necessary if the jurisdiction has

a history of failing to adequately investigate citizen complaints. For example, should the
focus be on drafting use-of-force guidelines? Should personnel records be kept on officers
who consistently fail to strike this balance? To what extent should citizens be involved in
the complaint process? To what extent should cfficers be disciplined for infractions and
what entity should mete out their punishment? These complex questions often have no
"right" or "wrong" answer and reaching a satisfactory result might take many different
forms. See Harter, supra note 161, at 17 (noting that political decisions necessarily have no
purely "right" answer).
211 In April 2001, Cincinnati Mayor Charlie Luken requested that DOJ conduct a review
of the Cincinnati Police Department's ("CPD") policies and procedures, specifically those
that related to the use of force. See CINCINNATI POLICE DEP'T, FIFTH STATUS REPORT TO THE
INDEPENDENT MONITOR 2 (Aug. 12, 2003).
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suit, unrelated to DOJ's investigation, against the city on behalf of a
plaintiff alleging racial profiling. The federal judge handling the racial
profiling suit, Judge Susan J. Dlott, believed that the complex issues
involved made an adversarial proceeding improper to dispose of the issues.
Instead, the Court urged the parties to reach a settlement that culminated in
a Collaborative Agreement involving citizens, the municipality, and police
officers.2 12
The parties to the suit agreed to take part in a negotiation and they also
invited the local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police, the local police
union, to take part in the negotiations.21 3 Judge Dlott appointed a local
conflict resolution specialist to direct the collaborative and appointed him
as special master. An advisory group consisting of attorneys and key
stakeholders was formed to work collectively to negotiate a collaborative
settlement that was ultimately signed in April 2002. The collaborative
settlement stipulated, among other things, that the City must adhere to the
provisions set forth in its MOA with DOJ pursuant to § 14141.214 Judge
Dlott described the purpose of the collaborative as
an opportunity to receive the viewpoints of all persons in the Cincinnati community
regarding their goals for community-police relations .,.. The collaborative will
include an opportunity for dialogue about these responses in structured group
sessions.... [T]he collaborative will also include a process for expert analysis of the
current practices of the Cincinnati Police Division and [best] practices in other
communities.215

The advisory group sought participation from many constituencies
across the city and organized the constituents into eight stakeholder groups
including: (1) African-Americans; (2) city employees; (3) police and their
families; (4) white citizens; (5) business/foundation/education leaders; (6)
religious and social service leaders; (7) youth; and (8) other minorities.
Through the media, these groups were invited to complete questionnaires
and participate in feedback groups.2 16 The advisory groups also sought the
assistance of a policing expert to research the best practices and model
programs to provide recommendations to the interested parties. 21 7 In
212

Jay

Rothman

& Randi Land,

The Cincinnati Police-Community Relations

Collaborative, 18 CRIM. JUST. 35, 36-37 (2004).
213

214
215

Id. at 36.
Id.
See id. at 37 (citing In re Cincinnati,Collaborative Agreement, Case No. C-1-99-317,

§ V n.10).
216

Id. at 37. The questionnaires focused on determining what goals each of these groups

had for police-community relations in Cincinnati, why those goals were important, and how
they thought those goals could be achieved. Over 3500 people answered the questionnaires.
Id.
217 See id.
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addition to the questionnaires, over 700 citizens participated in group
meetings with members of their stakeholder groups.21 8 Ultimately, in April
2002, the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement was signed and included,
among other things, substantive changes in recommendations on ways to
engage community members through problem-oriented policing,219use-offorce reporting, promotion and hiring, and citizen review processes.
Although it has faced challenges, the Cincinnati Collaborative
Agreement offers a unique model to ensure participation of stakeholders in
police reform and demonstrates that police and community members can
Future evaluation of
work together to reform police practices. 220
Cincinnati's collaborative experiment will assist policymakers in
determining ways to improve the process and to replicate it in other
jurisdictions. Given DOJ's willingness to negotiate police reforms and the
desires of the excluded stakeholders to participate in the reforms, § 14141
could provide an excellent vehicle for collaborative reform aimed at
improving institutional police practices. The next section explores how the
federal government could use regulatory negotiation as a model to achieve
similar collaborative reforms between police and community members.
C. APPLYING THE REGULATORY NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK TO
DOJ'S ENFORCEMENT PURSUANT TO § 14141
Consistent with the goals of ensuring political legitimacy and policecommunity collaboration, the framework of regulatory negotiation serves as
an excellent model to ensure stakeholder participation in the context of
DOJ's pattern or practice efforts to reform local police departments.221
Although the policies associated with DOJ's current reform process are
akin to administrative rulemaking, at present DOJ falls woefully short of
providing an adequate opportunity for participation that is generally

218
219

Id. at 38.
See generally id.

220 The Rand Corporation is currently assessing CPD's response to and implementation
of the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement. Reports from the Rand Corporation illustrate
that the Collaborative Agreement has not been without its challenges. For example,
although a 2005 report found that there was general community support for CPD, AfricanAmericans were more dissatisfied with CPD and more likely to believe that they were the
target of racial profiling. See JACK RILEY ET AL., POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN
Similarly, those residents living in neighborhoods with
CINCINNATI, at xxv (2005).
perceived high rates of crime were less likely to view CPD as favorable. See id. at xxv.
221 See Walker, supra note 23, at 17 (comparing DOJ's current process to that of
administrative rulemaking, and noting that "[a]dministrative rulemaking is a central part of
the consent decrees and memoranda of understanding secured by the Justice Department" in
its pattern or practice litigation).
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afforded to stakeholders in this type of administrative rulemaking.222 This
section explores how a "consensus-based negotiation" would proceed in the
context of DOJ's § 14141 pattern or practice litigation.
1. A Findingof a Pattern or Practiceof Constitutional Violations Triggers
the Negotiation Process
First, only a finding of a "pattern or practice" of unconstitutional
behavior and a decision by DOJ to exercise its authority to pursue
declaratory relief pursuant to § 14141 would trigger the "regulatory
negotiation" process. In administrative rulemaking, the administrative
agency makes a discretionary choice to propose a regulation in a particular
area after its examination of an issue.223 Because DOJ's decision to
exercise its authority under § 14141 is parallel to the agency's decision to
promulgate a rule, it follows that DOJ should retain the discretion to initiate
investigations and would be responsible for determining the outcome of
those investigations. 224 For this reason, DOJ's current investigation process
pursuant to § 14141 would remain unchanged by adopting the regulatory
negotiation framework.
2. Selecting a "Convenor" and Determining the Feasibility ofNegotiating
the Reforms
One of the first steps in the negotiation process involves the selection
of a neutral third party, known as a "convenor," to perform some initial, but
important, tasks with respect to the negotiation. 2 5 Once DOJ decides to
exercise its authority under § 14141 to seek reform of the law enforcement
agency at issue, the convenor would have primary responsibility for
determining the feasibility of negotiation, i.e., determining whether the
issues are amenable to negotiation. This is arguably the most critical step in
the process because it determines whether the negotiation will meet the
goals of developing adequate reforms and the interests of the stakeholders.

id.
For a general discussion of the steps in the rulemaking process that take place prior to

222 See
223

the agency's giving notice of proposed rulemaking, see Thomas McGarity, The Internal
Structure of the EPA, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991).
224 It is apparent that DOJ's initial investigations involve a fact-finding process by which
staff attorneys interview representatives from citizen groups and police officials. Indeed,
many of the investigations are initiated at the behest of interested citizen groups. However,
allowing stakeholder participation at the investigation and determination stage would seem
inconsistent with the absence of a private right of action. It is in the final phases of
fashioning reforms and the ongoing implementation of those reforms where citizens seem to
be excluded.
225 See Harter, supra note 161, at 70.

2008]

POLITICS OFPOLICING
3. Identifying Participantsin the Negotiation

The convenor would play an important role in ensuring the political
legitimacy of the process, because the convenor would also have the
primary responsibility of identifying the interested parties that would take
part in a particular negotiation and determining the appropriate
representatives of those parties.226 The convenor would be charged with
identifying, either through information gathered during DOJ's initial
investigation or conducting its own research and interviews, the appropriate
stakeholders and representatives. In addition to DOJ officials, police
managers, and city officials, other logical participants would include
representatives of community groups and representatives of rank-and-file
police officers.
One of the most important tenets of a successful negotiation is that
there should be a limited number of participants. 7 While the community
groups and police unions represent the two obvious groups currently
excluded by DOJ's process, depending upon the specifics in the
jurisdiction, there is always the possibility of including additional
stakeholders. In order to keep the numbers of participants manageable,
some groups could form caucuses with other groups to have their interests
represented.228 For example, suppose a neighborhood watch group was
concerned about the impact of DOJ's reforms on effective policing and
therefore wanted to participate in the negotiations. The convenor would
have the discretion to decide whether the rank-and-file police officers and
police managers could adequately represent the interests of a neighborhood
watch group. Similarly, a given jurisdiction may have several active
community groups concerned about police violence and the convenor might
encourage the groups to select an appropriate representative among them in
order to keep the actual number of participants to a manageable level.

226

See id. There are important arguments that militate against having DOJ officials act

as a convenor. Having a convenor other than DOJ ensures that the negotiations are not
structured based on the "political will" of DOJ officials.

A convenor potentially

depoliticizes some of the initial choices and ensures greater neutrality in the selection of
interested parties and representatives. See id. (describing how the use of a neutral third party
allows the participants to speak with candor). In his original formulation, Harter suggested a
number of possible sources for locating a convenor, including the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service. Id. at 71.
227 Id. at 46.
228See id. at 82 (discussing the possibility of forming caucuses in order to keep the
number of participant to a manageable level).
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4. Formation of an Advisory Committee andFacilitatedNegotiations
After determining the appropriate stakeholders and their
representatives, the convenor would be responsible for contacting the
interested parties and inviting them to participate in the negotiation. 22 9 The
convenor would then formally invite the representatives of the various
stakeholders to form an advisory committee that would negotiate a
settlement. 230 Stakeholders who have been invited to participate, but failed
to do so, would be precluded from challenging the final agreement. Much
like the settlement proceedings DOJ currently undertakes with city officials
and police executives, the full committee would review the information
gleaned from the fact-gathering process and begin developing a package of
reforms suited to the specific needs of the jurisdiction. However, in
contrast to DOJ's current negotiation process, under this proposal a
mediator (whose 3role
is distinct from that of the convenor) would facilitate
2 1
the negotiations.
During the course of the negotiation, the representatives of the
stakeholders would present information related to the specific problems and
conduct additional research, if necessary, to determine a collaborative
solution to the issues presented. Assuming the group reached a consensus
with respect to the problems identified in DOJ's initial investigation, the
232
group would assist in drafting the proposed reform provisions.2
In short,
if DOJ officials and representatives of affected interests meet as a group,
219Id. at 70-71 (discussing the role of the convenor).

In the context of police reform

stakeholders other than DOJ, city officials and police executives might include
representatives from citizen advisory groups, local churches, police unions, neighborhood
crime prevention councils, or similar entities.
230 See id. at 105. Participation in the negotiations might take various forms. For
instance, stakeholders could choose to participate by submitting comments.
231 While the roles of a convenor and mediator are distinct, it is possible that the same
person could perform both functions. See id. at 79. The role of the mediator also must not
be confused with that of an arbitrator, who actually makes determinations. See id. Rather,
the role of a facilitator would be to facilitate discussion and propose alternatives and creative
solutions without taking a position. See id. Harter advocates using a mediator without
substantive knowledge of the subject matter because of the danger that the mediator would
insert his own viewpoint, thus compromising his neutrality. See id. at 78.
232 There are several alternative ways to determine whether the group has reached a
consensus. In his description of the negotiation process, Harter notes that while unanimity is
preferable, it may also be impractical. Id. at 96. He describes several other possibilities for
determining a consensus, including "structured decisions" where the group creates a standard
for determining whether it has met a consensus, substantial majority, or concurrent
majorities. Id. Harter adds that consensus may be determined by a concurrent majority
where members of the group are identified by interest and caucuses are formed. In a
concurrent majority, each caucus must support the decision but each individual need not
support the specific decision. Id. A consensus could also be defined by a substantial
majority such as two-thirds or three-fourths of the group. Id. at 97.
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they would likely "be able to identify the issues involved, rank them
according to their relative priorities among the respective interests, conduct
sufficient research to address those issues, and make suitable tradeoffs in
working a position of consensus. 233
5.Review andApproval by DOJ
DOJ, after reviewing the MOA for consistency with applicable law,
would retain the ultimate authority to approve the package of reforms in the
MOA developed by the group.234 In the event the committee is unable to
reach a consensus, DOJ could then decide to seek injunctive relief pursuant
to § 14141.
VI. ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING A COLLABORATIVE
MODEL IN POLICE REFORM
A. BENEFITS OF APPLYING THE REGULATORY NEGOTIATION MODEL
TO POLICE REFORM

1. Stakeholder Inclusion Restores PoliticalLegitimacy of the Reform
Processand May FacilitateImplementation of the Reforms
The "overarching" benefit of the proposal to include police officers
and community members in the negotiation process is the added legitimacy
of the final reforms. 235 It is a well-established principle of democratic
233Harter, supra note 208, at 476.
234

Because a senior DOJ official is part of the committee, and has presumably kept other

agency officials abreast of the negotiations, any consensus reached should logically be
within the bounds of accepted alternative the agency is willing to consider. As Harter notes,
this does not mean that the agency should prevail on every issue, but the consensus would
reflect the differing viewpoints of the various parties, including DOJ officials. Harter, supra
note 161, at 100. If any revisions were necessary, the committee could review the revisions
to determine if there is still a consensus. In traditional rulemaking, the proposed rule would
still be subject to notice and comment by the public. Unlike traditional administrative
rulemaking, DOJ's current practice, of course, does not involve additional opportunities for
the public to comment on the reforms settled upon by DOJ and the respective police
department. The agreements between DOJ and the requisite city officials do not contain
provisions allowing individuals and interest groups to comment on or influence the resulting
agreement. My proposal to apply negotiated rulemaking practices to DOJ's enforcement
likewise does not allow for a subsequent comment on the reforms achieved by consensus.
Under my proposal, an additional comment period would be obsolete in the context of DOJ's
enforcement under § 14141 because many of the interested parties would have already been
invited to the initial negotiation process.
235 The political legitimacy rationale is frequently mentioned as justification underlying
transparency in the administrative rulemaking context. Great efforts are made to include the
interested parties in the development of the rule, including the requirement that, prior to
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theory that those directly impacted by a policy should be able to participate
in the development of that policy. For example, David Skalansky notes that
the theme of legitimacy has become "increasingly prominent in criminal
procedure jurisprudence and scholarship. 236 Whether this legitimacy is
perceived or actual, theories of participatory democracy stress "the value of
participation in making governmental decisions more acceptable to those
affected by them." 237 As Professor Harter notes, if all the parties viewed the
outcome as "reasonable and endorsed it without a fight," there would be a
greater likelihood that the groups charged with implementing the rules or
reforms would "buy in" to those reforms.238 The opportunity for
stakeholders to participate in the reform process creates a feeling of
"ownership" and "increases their commitment to its successful
implementation., 239 Thus, the parties are more likely to implement rules
when they have participated in developing those rules through a consensus
process.240 This enhanced legitimacy could have positive implications for
police reform efforts because if those responsible for implementing police
services embrace the reform efforts rather than lobby against requirements
they view as illegitimately imposed upon
them, they are more likely to
24 1
participate in the implementation process.
Extolling the additional benefits that flow from the "enhanced
legitimacy," legal scholars have long noted the intrinsic values of citizen
participation in implementing public law remedies. 24 First, the perceived
legitimacy resulting from the ability to participate increases the
participants' willingness to cooperate with the proposed remedy.243 Second,
participation serves an "integrative function" of involving those responsible
adopting a rule, the proposed rule must be published in the Federal Register. The inclusion
of various viewpoints is paramount and the interested parties are given an opportunity to
comment on the rule. The agency then responds to these comments before promulgating the
final rule. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 208, at 471-76 (discussing the justification for
administrative rulemaking and the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act); see
also Harter, supra note 161, at 23 (noting the importance of interested parties to participate
in the development of regulations in order to achieve political acceptance of the regulations).
236 David Skalansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1792 (2005).
237 Id.
238 Harter, supra note 161, at 31.
239 Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance in the Administrative State, 45 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1, 24 (1997) ("Parties are thought to be more likely to implement rules produced by a
consensus in which they are a part.").
240 Id. at 23.
241 As Harter notes, this "perceived lack of legitimacy may reduce voluntary
compliance." Harter, supra note 161, at 22.
242 See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation,78 IOWA L. REV.981 (1993)
(discussing participation values implicated by the consent decree process).
243 See id. at 997.
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for implementing reform to appreciate their relationship to the problem and
their role in addressing the underlying problem. 24 4

Third, participation

encourages incorporation of varying perspectives, thereby resulting in
superior substantive outcomes. 45 Finally, participation provides valuable
information about the possible impediments in the reform process as well as
possible solutions.246
Thus, the legitimacy rationale for stakeholder
participation is inextricably linked to the success of the reform effort.
2. Stakeholder Inclusion and the Presence of a MediatorProvides a
"Check" on DOJ'sEnforcement Authority
Another benefit of the proposed model of consensus-based negotiation
is its response to critics' concerns regarding the political "whims" of
DOJ. 247 The proposed model does not, of course, address the political
considerations with respect to DOJ's initial decision to exercise its § 14141
authority. However, the selection of stakeholders by a neutral third party
and the presence of a neutral mediator at the negotiations make it less likely
that improper political considerations will impact the nature of the
substantive reforms.
For example, a political administration desiring to be perceived as
"tough on crime" might fail to pursue aggressive reforms for fear of
alienating constituents. This fear might result in diluted, ineffective
remedial measures.
Conversely, an administration that wants to be
perceived as a champion of civil rights might aggressively extract reforms
from police departments that are unrealistic and thus equally ineffective.
The presence of a mediator ameliorates concerns about power differentials
between the various stakeholders, and therefore ensures that politically
powerful or better funded groups do not dominate the reform process and
extract reforms solely for their benefit.
3. Innovation and Specifically Tailored Remedies
Allowing stakeholder participation encourages incorporation of
varying perspectives and may result in superior substantive outcomes. 248
Applying the negotiated rulemaking framework to DOJ's police reform
efforts provides the opportunity for developing creative solutions based on
the dynamics of the respective jurisdiction. The rules emerging from the

244
245

246
247
248

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Gilles, supra note 19, at 1418.
See Sturm, supra note 242, at 997.
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negotiation process tend to reflect a "shop-floor insight and expertise. ' 49
Therefore, negotiation "can develop considerable innovation and take
account of issues that would
likely escape the attention of an agency in a
250
traditional rulemaking.,
To illustrate how this process might work in the context of police
reform, imagine that DOJ's initial investigation of a particular jurisdiction
revealed a problem with excessive uses of force. As part of the remedy,
DOJ proposes instituting a use-of-force policy, detailing what types of force
might be acceptable in certain situations. In this context, additional
stakeholders would also have an opportunity to be heard on this matter.
Participating DOJ officials might suggest implementing new use-of-force
tracking procedures and might propose to model these procedures on those
that have been instituted elsewhere.
Citizen groups in the affected
jurisdiction, however, might have specific knowledge of bothersome
patterns of certain types of uses of force, such as the deployment of canines
in non-threatening traffic stops. Police officers, although not willing to
cease deployment of canines in certain situations, might be willing to
document the use of canines in all situations and assist in crafting
guidelines for when canines may be deployed. Through this participatory
process, citizens might learn the value of canines in law enforcement and
police officers might learn the distrust and resentment created by random
deployment of dogs in the investigation of minor infractions. Together, the
representatives bring more relevant information to bear on the issues and
are able to craft a creative solution reflecting the interests of all involved
constituents.
To illustrate further the value of stakeholder participation, take a
scenario set forth by Professor Livingston. In her early discussion of
§ 14141 regarding the rank-and-file officer's approach to reforming the
civilian complaint review process, Professor Livingston notes, "[Police
officers] may not trust supervisors to recognize that the number of
complaints filed against an officer may signal an important problem, but
may also reflect something else-even the efforts of a neighborhood's
serious law violators to rid themselves of a persistent law enforcement
agent. '' 251 This example not only illustrates the divergent interests of the
rank-and-file officers and their employers, but also demonstrates the
benefits of including various stakeholders, particularly those with intimate
knowledge of an issue. Here, the first-hand knowledge of the rank-and-file

249

Philip Harter, Fearof Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389,

1403 (1997).
250 Id.
251 Livingston, supra note 75, at 849.
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officers may provide valuable insights and provide for a more effective
civilian complaint review process without compromising the safety of the
residents within the community.
The development of a civilian complaint review board ("CCRB")
provides yet another example of how consensus-based negotiations could
create a superior reform mechanism within a given jurisdiction. A CCRB
can take many different forms and may be empowered in many different
ways. Although there are some basic principles about which types of
boards are most effective, there may be a range of acceptable alternatives.
Stakeholder participation could be valuable in a jurisdiction where
community members have been dissatisfied with the composition of a
CCRB. For example, community members may argue that the CCRB
should not contain police officials for fear that these officers could not be
impartial. The police officers may fear that those members of a CCRB
comprised only of citizens would not adequately appreciate the context of
certain uses of force in the way trained officers may be able to appreciate
the same use of force. In such a situation, both the community members
and police officers could present their views during the negotiation process.
The stakeholders may be privy to information that DOJ is not and this
information could be used in establishing a CCRB and developing
procedures for investigating civilian complaints that are satisfactory to all
parties. Even in a failed negotiation, where the group is unable to reach a
consensus, DOJ, at a minimum, has learned more information regarding the
interests of the stakeholders and can suggest remedies based upon the
interests.2 52
B. CHALLENGES TO APPLYING A COLLABORATIVE MODEL TO DOJ'S
POLICE REFORM EFFORTS
1. Will Consensus-BasedNegotiation Subvert DOJ's Authority, Resulting in
InferiorReforms?
Notwithstanding the myriad benefits of applying the negotiated
rulemaking model to police reform, an examination of this proposal would
be incomplete if it failed to consider the potential fault lines that lurk
beneath the surface of this proposed model. While much of the literature
regarding negotiated rulemaking is complimentary, not all critiques are

252 See William Funk, BargainingToward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation
and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1366 (1997) (noting that even
in failed negotiations, participants may impart valuable information to the agency for use in
crafting its own proposal).
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supportive of the paradigm. 25 3 By far, the most resounding criticism of the
negotiated rulemaking framework is that it subverts the agency's authority,
thus compromising the public interest.254 Some critics argue that regulatory
negotiation creates incentives for the participants that lead to "inferior
outcomes. 255 Specifically, Professor Cary Coglianese argues that the
negotiated rulemaking process's emphasis on reaching a consensus presents
several important limitations. 56 Coglianese asserts that participants in the
negotiation may be reluctant to raise important issues that would hinder the
ability to attain a consensus.257 Coglianese further argues that in order to
secure consensus agreements, participants may adopt vague language,
ultimately8 "constrain[ing] the effectiveness of any resulting public
25
policy.

One can anticipate how opponents of adopting the negotiated
rulemaking framework in DOJ's pattern or practice settlements could
conscript similar arguments articulated against regulatory negotiation.
Opponents may argue that the reforms sought pursuant to § 14141 would be
diluted and ineffective through this model. For example, if stakeholders
who view the reforms as hindering effective law enforcement are allowed to
participate, they may be unwilling to agree to those reforms. Such
stakeholders may even suggest reforms that are less effective at satisfying
the remedial goals. Conversely, others might argue that stakeholders who
advocate aggressive policies will extract reforms that impede the law
enforcement agency's ability to adequately police the jurisdiction.
These concerns underscore the importance of having DOJ's officials
actively participate in the negotiation process. To ensure that the reforms
reflect § 14141's mandate to rectify unconstitutional patterns of police
misconduct, it should be made clear to the negotiating committee that DOJ
253 For detailed critiques of the problems posed by regulatory negotiation, see generally
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Phil

Harter,9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, (2001); William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA'sWoodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L.
55 (1987); Rena Steinzor & Scott Strauss, Building a Consensus: Agencies Stressing "Reg
Neg" Approach, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at 16.
254 See Funk, supra note 253, at 96 (describing regulatory negotiation in the context of
EPA's regulation of woodstove emissions); Steinzor & Strauss, supra note 253 (arguing that
EPA's policy of having the agency to commit in advance to the proposal of the participants
allows the agency to ignore its statutory obligation in an all-out campaign to promote
consensus).

255 See Morriss et al., supra note 207, at 198 (summarizing the arguments against
regulatory negotiation).
256 Coglianese, supra note 253, at 439-40.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 440-41.

Finally, Coglianese's empirical research suggests that regulatory

negotiation fails to meet its primary goals in that it neither saves time nor reduces litigation.
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would adopt the proposed reforms only if they are satisfactory to DOJ.
Throughout the process, DOJ officials could provide guidance to the parties
on disputed areas and keep the participants informed about DOJ's position
on various matters. DOJ's senior staff would determine whether the
package of reforms would result in meaningful changes in the police
department's conformity with constitutional norms and in line with
practices used in various jurisdictions around the country. 259 Thus, unlike
"unsuccessful" negotiated rulemakings cited by some opponents of
regulatory negotiation, DOJ would make the final decision regarding the
reforms. 260 Not only would DOJ retain its sovereignty in developing
remedial measures pursuant to § 14141, but adopting a negotiated
rulemaking approach would also bring the additional benefit of having the
collective expertise and viewpoints of those directly impacted by the
decision. Still, critics may argue that because DOJ has the final authority
over whether to implement the reforms, there is no incentive for the
stakeholders to participate. This view ignores the possibility that as long a
DOJ officials negotiate in good faith and value the participants' ideas,
groups-particularly the previously excluded stakeholders-may still be
able to exert some influence over the decisions where they could have no
such influence under DOJ's current settlement process.
Furthermore, determining at the outset whether or not a specific
situation lends itself to negotiation will ameliorate many of the criticisms
leveled against negotiated rulemaking in the context of police reform. 261
Proponents of regulatory negotiation have long recognized that not all
issues are amenable to negotiation.26 2 DOJ's efforts to negotiate police
reforms pursuant to § 14141, however, fit the criteria for "successful
negotiations" identified by Professor Harter.263 First, the interests affected
259 To this end, DOJ's Principlesfor Promoting Police Integrity provides examples of

certain policies and practices from police departments around the country that DOJ finds
acceptable. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY, supra note
119.
260 Harter, supra note 161, at 65. Harter notes that while the final decision regarding a
newly developed regulation may not be the exact rule the agency would have developed
absent the negotiation process, any new rule would fall within the "range of reasonableness,"
and the agency retains its sovereignty because ultimately, it is the agency that makes the
final decision). Id.
261 See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the convenor to
determine the feasibility of the negotiation).
262 Harter, supra note 161, at 42-51 (discussing several preconditions for determining
whether negotiation of a particular rule or regulation is likely to be successful); see also
Harter, supra note 208, at 479-80 (discussing preconditions for successful negotiations).
263 Harter identifies the following preconditions for successful negotiations: (1) the
interests affected by the proposed policy are easily identified; (2) only a limited number of
interests should be able to participate; (3) no single interest should dominate the negotiations
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by the reform process are easily identified and are not so broad that they
cannot be represented by a combination of community groups, police
unions, municipal officials, and DOJ officials. 264 Adding representatives
from various community groups and police unions will not increase the
number of participants beyond a manageable number.2 65 Furthermore, there
is little danger that the participants will consider issues not yet ripe for
discussion or fail to adequately identify the issues at hand. Prior to
negotiating or initiating a lawsuit, DOJ's practice has been to send a
"findings letter" to the jurisdiction detailing the specific violations. Based
upon these findings, the parties will know what issues they must address to
comply with DOJ's mandate and will be limited to negotiating only these
"ripe" issues. The excessive delays envisioned by critics are similarly
forestalled by mandating a strict deadline for reaching a consensus. If no
consensus is reached within the deadline, DOJ could result to its default
position and simply file suit.
Similarly, the issues involved in police reform, unlike the issues in
"unsuccessful" negotiations, do not require the parties to "compromise
a
fundamental value. 266 In the context of police reform, the parties are
working toward the common goal of assuring that the police services so
critical to our society are administered in a manner that preserves basic civil
rights. While no one would disagree that police officers should do their
best to protect the public from those who violate criminal laws, everyone

and countervailing power should be present to prevent one interest from extracting
unacceptable concessions from another interest; (4) the issues should be ripe for discussion;
(5) the issues involved should not require the parties to compromise a fundamental value
(i.e., questions such as which religion is best are not suitable for negotiation); (6) there
should be a number of diverse issues that the participants are able to prioritize; (7) a deadline
should be imposed for finalizing the proposed rule or reform; and (8) the agency must be
willing to use the negotiation process to develop the reforms. Harter, supra note 208, at 47980.
264 For example, signatories to the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement
included the
Cincinnati Black United Front, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, the
City of Cincinnati, and the Fraternal Order of Police. Collaborative Agreement, In re
Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-3170, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5,
2002). This effort is representative of the ways in which interested community groups, along
with police executives and union officials, might come together to adequately represent the
various interests at stake.
265 Harter recommends limiting the number of participants to fifteen. Harter, supra note
208, at 479.
266 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1209 (1994). Rose-Ackerman's example of a
consensual negotiation between the Catholic Church and a pro-choice organization aptly
illustrates the point that issues of fundamental values are not appropriate for consensus. Id.
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would also agree that police power is not without limits. 267 Finally, the

agency must be willing to negotiate the policies at issue. As demonstrated
by its current enforcement strategy of § 14141, DOJ has exhibited
a
268
willingness to use the negotiation process to develop the reforms.
2. Will DOJ andPolice Unions Embrace Stakeholder Inclusion?
While DOJ has evinced a willingness to negotiate the reform, it has
been far less willing to include all the various stakeholders in the
negotiation process. In order to be successful, the proposal to use a form of
negotiated rulemaking would necessitate the full support of all of the
affected interests, including those of community members and rank-and-file
officers. DOJ's opposition to the intervention of community members and
rank-and-file police officers in the Los Angeles Consent Decree suggests
that there may be some hesitancy on the part of the current administration to
allow local interests to participate in the reform process. The negotiations
will necessarily involve a certain degree of logistical complexity, but any
inconvenience will be outweighed by the increased political legitimacy,
cooperation and innovative solutions resulting from the inclusion.
Similarly, police unions may be hesitant to join conversations with
DOJ to reform local police practices. Historically, rank-and-file police
officers have resisted various oversight efforts and, at times, police officers
have reacted violently to reform efforts. 269 However, given the impact that
the reforms may have on their interests, rank-and-file officers may be
persuaded of the benefits of consensual rulemaking in the context of police
reform.
An in-depth analysis of Cincinnati's experience with a collaborative
approach to police reform is necessary to determine whether the potential
benefits of stakeholder inclusion are realized through the collaborative
Thus, despite some disappointment over DOJ's decisions to negotiate settlements
rather than force court-ordered injunctive relief, there are obvious merits to DOJ's unwritten
policy to negotiate these reforms. From the perspective of police officers, they are charged
with protecting citizens from individuals who, based upon the officer's professional
experience, pose a danger to other citizens. In addition, police officers must perform this
task while simultaneously taking their own physical safety into account. Citizens, from their
perspective, want protection from police officers, but not at the expense of sacrificing their
own personal liberties. When police officers misbehave, as public officials, they should be
held accountable.
268 See Harter, supranote 208, at 479-80.
269 See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 29, at 223. For example, in 1992, as a result of
Mayor David Dinkins's proposal to staff a police review board with civilians, New York
police officers blocked the Brooklyn Bridge. The officers protested violently and shouted
racial epithets at the mayor and passersby. Id. at 223; see also CHEVIGNY, supra note 62, at
64-65.
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process. Lessons learned from Cincinnati will be valuable to future policy
makers and DOJ officials who seek to include stakeholders in police reform
and in determining whether collaborative governance models can succeed
in this context where many other remedies have failed.
VII. CONCLUSION

The application of regulatory negotiation to DOJ's efforts to
systemically reform local law enforcement agencies envisioned by this
Article seeks to provide a practical solution to ensure stakeholder inclusion
in federal reform of local police agencies. Police misconduct continues to
be a troubling phenomenon in American society, and it is clear that
remedial measures must engage law enforcement agencies to effectively
address institutional policies that cultivate or tolerate police misconduct.
Where traditional remedies have failed to engender widespread systemic
reform, § 14141, with its emphasis on implementing systemic reforms, has
the potential to transform local police departments throughout the nation.
The success of § 14141, however, is inextricably linked to the legitimacy of
the reforms, as perceived by the community members and police officers
directly impacted by the reforms. Thus, DOJ's continued exclusion of these
key stakeholders undermines the implementation of the reforms. Similarly,
any institutional changes that occur while jurisdictions are subject to federal
oversight may not outlive the terms of the agreements if community
members and rank-and-file officers are precluded from taking ownership of
these reforms. The federal government, police unions, and community
members must learn to collaborate in order to develop lasting institutional
reforms of the nation's law enforcement agencies.

